 |
Compact version |
|
 |
        |
|
 |
||
|
Sunday, 22 December 2024
|
||
 |
 |
|
|
|
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 94, 00-05-16Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next ArticleFrom: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>RFE/RL NEWSLINEVol. 4, No. 94, 16 May 2000CONTENTS[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
[C] END NOTE
[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA[01] NEW ARMENIAN PREMIER FIRES SEVERAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALSAndranik Markarian on 15 May dismissed three seniorgovernment officials with ties either to the Yerkrapah Union of Veterans of the Karabakh war or to the former ruling Armenian Pan-National Movement, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported. They are Andranik Kocharian (no relation to President Robert Kocharian), who is an aide to sacked Prime Minister Aram Sargsian; chief of government staff Shahen Karamanukian; and the head of the government press and information department, Tigran Hakobian. Government sources told RFE/RL that it is unlikely that either Minister for Industrial Infrastructure Vahan Shirkhanian or Minister for State Revenues Smbat Ayvazian will retain their posts in the new government. Both men are leading members of the Yerkrapah Union. LF [02] ARMENIAN WAR VETERANS QUIT PARLIAMENT MAJORITY BLOCAlso on15 May, 10 parliamentary deputies belonging to Yerkrapah informed parliamentary speaker Armen Khachatrian that they are quitting the majority Miasnutiun bloc. The same day, two other Yerkrapah members quit the second-largest parliamentary faction, Kayunutiun, Noyan Tapan and RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported. Their transfer of allegiance leaves Miasnutiun with a total of 50 deputies in the 131-member legislature, while Kayunutiun now has 20 deputies. LF [03] GUARD INJURED IN ATTACK ON ARMENIAN GENERAL'S RESIDENCEAguard was seriously injured on the night of 14 May when unidentified persons tried to attack the home of Major General Arkadii Ter-Tadevossian, ITAR-TASS and Noyan Tapan reported. Ter-Tadevossian told journalists in Yerevan on 15 May that he is certain the attack was connected with his creation last week of a parallel organization to Yerkrapah. The new organization, like Yerkrapah, also aims to defend the interests of Karabakh war veterans (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 11 May 2000). LF [04] AZERBAIJAN WANTS GREATER ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH RUSSIAMeeting in Baku on 15 May with visiting Russian actingMinister for CIS Affairs Leonid Drachevskii, Azerbaijan's President Heidar Aliev called for increasing bilateral cooperation in the agricultural sector and offered to export early fruits and vegetables to the Russian Federation, ITAR- TASS reported. Other senior Azerbaijani officials have in recent months advocated intensifying economic cooperation with Russia. Drachevskii, for his part, expressed interest in closer cooperation in the energy sector. He reportedly also tried to persuade Aliev to drop his opposition to the creation of a CIS free-trade zone, according to Turan. That issue is to figure prominently on the agenda of the 21 June CIS summit, at which Aliev is expected to hold another round of confidential talks with his Armenian counterpart. LF [05] ANOTHER AIRCRAFT SMUGGLING SCANDAL HITS KAZAKHSTANA totalof 22 aircraft engines and 40 engines for missiles, all designated as scrap metal being shipped by a company in southern Kazakhstan, were confiscated by Russian customs officials on the Russian-Finnish border last week, RFE/RL's Almaty bureau reported on 16 May, quoting National Security Committee spokesman Kenzhebulat Beknazarov. LF [06] INDEPENDENT KAZAKH NEWSPAPER UNDER PRESSURERamazanEsergepov, editor of the Almaty-based paper "Nachnem s ponedelnkia," told journalists in the former Kazakh capital on 16 May that municipal officials are trying to evict the newspaper from its premises, RFE/RL's Almaty correspondent reported. Esergepov said that pressure is politically motivated and a response to articles the newspaper had recently published criticizing Almaty Mayor Viktor Khrapunov. LF [07] KYRGYZSTAN'S SUPREME COURT REJECTS ELECTION APPEALTheSupreme Court on 15 May rejected an appeal by arrested opposition Ar-Namys party chairman Feliks Kulov to annul the outcome of the run-off election he contested in the southern constituency of Kara-Buura in March, RFE/RL's Bishkek bureau reported. Kulov had polled 40 percent of the vote during the first round on 20 February, but according to official returns, which were subsequently widely disputed, he garnered only 36 percent in the 12 March runoff (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 and 22 March 2000). On 11 May, the Supreme Court upheld a 4 April ruling by a local court annulling the second-round election victory of opposition politician Dosbol Nur Uulu. LF [08] PAKISTANI LEADER VISITS TURKMENISTANOn his first-ever visitto a former Soviet republic, General Parvez Musharraf met in Ashgabat on 15 May with Turkmenistan's President Saparmurat Niyazov to discuss boosting political and economic cooperation, Interfax reported. Among concrete projects discussed was the construction of rail and road links and the planned natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan. The implementation of that last project is contingent on an end to the civil war in Afghanistan (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 8 December 1998 and 7 March 2000). LF [09] TURKMEN PRESIDENT REMAINS LUKEWARM ON CISThe CIS ExecutiveSecretary briefed Niyazov in Ashgabat on 15 May about the agenda for the upcoming CIS summit, ITAR-TASS reported. But the Turkmen president repeated his earlier preference for bilateral, rather than multilateral, cooperation within the CIS, adding that there is no point in signing CIS documents if there is doubt whether they will be effective. Niyazov noted that the CIS Bank has failed to recover debts by other CIS member states to Turkmenistan for supplies of natural gas. LF [B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE[10] SERBIAN OPPOSITION REMAINS DEFIANT...Up to 25,000 peopledemonstrated in Belgrade on 15 May in support of the Otpor (Resistance) student organization, which the authorities claim is behind the recent murder of Bosko Perosevic, a top official in Vojvodina (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 May 2000). The rally passed without incident, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. The Serbian Renewal Movement's (SPO) Vuk Draskovic called the authorities "terrorists and murderers" for their crackdown on Otpor. The Democratic Party's Zoran Djindjic called upon the army and the police to cease obeying Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and "save the people painlessly and end the crisis in the country quickly." He did not elaborate. Djindjic later told Reuters that he hopes "Milosevic got the message that if the repression against Otpor continues, it will provoke a chain reaction, the end of which no one can predict." PM [11] ...WHILE BELGRADE KEEPS UP INTIMIDATIONRally organizers hadhoped for a larger turnout for the Belgrade protest on 15 May and believe that many people stayed home because they feared regime violence, Reuters reported. The authorities put up "wanted posters" for two Otpor members in conjunction with the Novi Sad killing, but Otpor spokesmen said that the two activists were visiting their relatives in the Republika Srpska at the time of the murder. Meanwhile, Yugoslav Information Minister Goran Matic stressed that Otpor is an "unregistered, fascist organization" and will be treated accordingly. In response, Milan Protic and several other opposition leaders joined Otpor in a show of solidarity. Leading Serbian nationalist writer Dobrica Cosic joined the student group the previous week. PM [12] WHO WAS MILIVOJE GUTOVIC?Controversy centers around theperson of Perosevic's assassin and his possible motives, "Vesti" reported on 16 May. Spokesmen of both Otpor and the SPO denied that he was a member of their respective organizations, although the authorities claim he was. Two weeks before the killing, Gutovic had praised Milosevic at a funeral that was attended by 200 people, "Vesti" continued. Several people in his community said that some of Gutovic's recent public remarks about Lenin and Stalin had caused some people to question his mental stability. Elsewhere, an unidentified Democratic Party official told London's "The Guardian" that Gutovic was known locally in Novi Sad as a supporter of Milosevic's Socialist Party, of which Perosevic was a high official. PM [13] WHY DID MOSCOW HOST INDICTED WAR CRIMINAL?A spokesman forCarla Del Ponte, who is the Hague-based war crimes tribunal's chief prosecutor, said on 15 May that she is "alarmed" by reports that Yugoslav Defense Minister Dragoljub Ojdanic recently visited Moscow (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 May 2000). The spokesman added: "It's likely the prosecutor will enquire directly of the Russian embassy in The Hague whether the reports are accurate and why the Russian authorities did not take any steps to arrest a person under indictment by the tribunal.... To my knowledge, this is the first time any of the individuals indicted last 26 May...have traveled outside Yugoslavia since the indictment. This is a remarkable occurrence," Reuters reported. Meanwhile, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic arrived in Moscow on 15 May. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said the next day that his talks with Jovanovic about Kosova "will enable us to continue helping to achieve a settlement of the problem and to stabilize the situation in the entire Balkan region." PM [14] BELGRADE REGIME LAUNCHES APARTMENT-BUILDING CAMPAIGNTheauthorities began a campaign across Serbia on 15 May to build 100,000 new apartments for young couples, military personnel, and police. The apartments will be built at the rate of 10,000 annually for the next 10 years, Reuters reported. PM [15] EU SUPPORT FOR MONTENEGROChris Patten, who is the EU'scommissioner for foreign affairs, said in Podgorica on 15 May that Brussels will provide $50 million in aid to bolster President Milo Djukanovic's government against pressure from Milosevic. Patten called the partnership between Brussels and Podgorica "good and effective," AP reported. Patten denied that the aid is intended to help Djukanovic in the 11 June local elections, adding that the money is "support for a government that believes in elections. Where countries opt for democracy we want to place ourselves generously on their side." Patten stressed: "I believe that the EU aid will reaffirm the will of Montenegrins to follow our democratic policies." PM [16] BULGARIAN PRESIDENT PRAISES INDEPENDENT MACEDONIAVisitingSkopje on 15 May, Petar Stoyanov commented, "Long live independent Macedonia. We must not miss this historical opportunity to live as friends and respect each other," Reuters reported. He and Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski signed nine bilateral agreements and issued a joint declaration expressing concern about "extremism in the region," AP reported. PM [17] RACAN SPELLS OUT CROATIAN 100-DAY PLANPrime Minister IvicaRacan told journalists in Zagreb on 15 May that "in the next 100 days, the focus of our work will be the central, dramatic issue of the economy. Our aim is to strengthen the economy, stimulate growth, employment, [and] exports," Reuters reported (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 May 2000). The government is considering cutting value-added tax from 22 percent to 19 percent in the hope of encouraging investment, he added. Deputy Prime Minister Slavko Linic said that the leading insurance company, Croatia Osiguranje, will be put up for sale later in the year. It failed to find a buyer in 1999. Among other companies slated for privatization are the oil and gasoline enterprise Ina and the power company HEP, he added. PM [18] U.S. SUSPENDS MILITARY SUPPORT FOR BOSNIAN CROAT MILITARYIna statement on 15 May, the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo confirmed local press reports that the Defense Department has stopped military support for the Bosnian Croat military. According to that statement: "The United States has suspended selected training and advisory activities conducted by the U.S. firm Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) for the Bosnian Croat component of the [mainly Muslim and Croat] federation army. The suspension is indefinite and will continue until the United States receives confirmation that the Bosnian Croat component has taken the required steps toward integration [with the Muslim military]. In addition, the U.S. government has suspended International Military Education and Training-funded training for Bosnian Croat members of the federation military scheduled to begin on or after 12 May 2000," Reuters reported. PM [19] SMUGGLING CONTINUES TO MEAN BIG LOSSES FOR BOSNIANFEDERATIONBosnian federal officials have concluded that smuggling along some 450 "illegal roads" crossing the federation's frontiers costs Sarajevo some $200 million annually. The officials stress that only solution is to intensify cooperation with neighboring countries, but so far Croatia has not responded to Bosnian requests on this matter, "Dnevni avaz" reported on 16 May. PM [20] ROMANIAN MONEY-LAUNDERING SCANDAL LINKED TO ILIESCU'SCAMPAIGN...Romanian customs officials are investigating possible fraud related to the import of campaign materials used by former President Ion Iliescu in the 1996 presidential campaign, Romanian media reported on 14 May. Customs Office Director Nini Sapunaru announced that there is a strong suspicion that 1 million electoral posters printed by one of Romanian-born Adrian Costea's companies in France were imported tax-free. Costea is currently under investigation by a French commission on money-laundering charges. ZsM [21] ...WHILE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY ATTACKS RULING COALITIONTheopposition Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) called the money-laundering scandal an "extremely aggressive negative campaign" orchestrated by the current ruling coalition against the PDSR, the daily "Adevarul" reported on 13 May. It also noted that PDSR officials involved in the investigation as witnesses will no longer make any public declarations. However, PDSR President Ion Iliescu on 15 May admitted that Costea supported his 1996 campaign by printing various materials and also assisted in the translation of one of his books. But he denied having made a profit from the activities. The same day, PDSR Senator Radu Timofte accused President Emil Constantinescu of staging the scandal to end Iliescu's candidacy for the presidency and of wanting to reinstate the monarchy. ZsM [22] ROMANIANS TAKE COLD SHOWERSThe main Romanian thermal energyprovider, Termoelectrica, announced on 15 May that it has ceased providing services to local partners with major debts, Romanian media reported. As a result, some 6 million people-- including most of the residents of Bucharest and several major cities--were left without hot water. Termoelectrica, which provides energy to some 40 percent of Romania's households, needs to collect some 3.5 trillion lei ($175 million) from local distributors, which blame the problem on non-paying owner associations. ZsM [23] CORRECTION:In the 12 May issue of "RFE/RL Newsline," theVenice Commission was incorrectly referred to as an expert body of the EU. It is, in fact, a body of the Council of Europe. [24] AFGHAN VETERANS PROTEST IN MOLDOVAMore than 1,000 Sovietveterans of the war in Afghanistan demonstrated on 15 May in Chisinau against cuts in their benefits, Reuters reported. The veterans called for the dissolution of the parliament, the resignation of President Petru Lucinschi, and early elections. They also demanded that benefits eliminated in April be reinstated. There are some 12,000 veterans of the Afghan war living in Moldova. PB [25] BULGARIAN PRESIDENT SAYS CABINET WILL SURVIVE CONFIDENCEVOTEPetar Stoyanov said on 15 May in Sofia that the government of Premier Ivan Kostov will pass a no-confidence motion to be held this week, BTA reported. Stoyanov said, however, that each no-confidence vote "should provide ground for reflection to the incumbents." He said Kostov's cabinet ministers should "decide how they will rule until the end of their term." In other news, Bulgarian troops took part in the "Linked Seas 2000" military exercises near Lisbon, Portugal on 14 May. Dimitrov Mikhov, the Bulgarian chief of staff, said the maneuvers provided "an important boost" to the country's bid to join NATO. PB [C] END NOTE[26] REGIONS, REPUBLICS, AND REFORMBy Paul GoblePresident Vladimir Putin's creation of seven new federal districts headed by presidential appointees is clearly intended to re-establish Moscow's control over the Russian Federation's far-flung regions. But it appears almost certain that it will have just the opposite effect. Coming on the heels of his efforts to rein in regional governments in Bashkortostan and Ingushetia last week, Putin's 13 May decree sets the stage for a new kind of regional politics, one that could lead to an intensification of the ongoing struggle between the center and the periphery. And just as was the case at the end of the Soviet period, when Mikhail Gorbachev tried to retake control over the union republics, that struggle could have a powerful impact on Putin's ability to govern and to promote whatever reforms he says he would like to introduce. There are three reasons for this conclusion: First, Putin's 13 May decree also calls for the elimination of the system of presidential envoys attached to the regional governments. This suggests the decree itself was a compromise between those who wanted to re- establish Moscow's control over the periphery and those who like things the way they are. More important, Putin is removing the very stratum of officials his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had unsuccessfully sought to use to control the regions without creating a system that has any more powers, even on paper, to intervene in the actions of regional and republic governments. Second, Putin's action was, after all, by decree. To make this system work, the Russian president may well have to seek a constitutional amendment, a process that at the very least will spark a new regional politics and one that Putin and his allies cannot be sure of winning. If these seven new federal districts are not constitutionalized, regional leaders are likely to view them either as an annoyance that they can ignore, the base for the projection of their own power if the district capital is the same as their own, or a new forum in which they can combine to advance their interests. If regional leaders seek to ignore these new bodies, then Putin will either have to invest them with force or watch them turn into the latest stillborn creation of the post-Soviet period. But if they either try to take control of these bodies or combine to oppose them, he may find himself confronted by larger and more powerful combinations of regions, hardly the outcome he and his aides say they want. And third, the actual powers these presidential representatives will have, either legally or politically, remains far from clear at the moment. Much depends on whom Putin selects, the powers he gives them, and their ability and willingness to work with the governors and republican presidents under their control. If Putin names politically significant people to these posts, at least some of them are likely to take advantage of the situation to build their own power bases, especially since in the absence of force or other resources, they will likely have to develop good working relations with the regional elites if they are to accomplish anything. But if he names faceless members of the bureaucracy, the elected regional governors and republic presidents are likely to view these new representatives with little or no more respect than they did Yeltsin's envoys to their own territories, thereby severely limiting the representatives' utility to Moscow. That, in turn, could prompt Putin either to reach new compromises with regional elites or to rely ever more on the use of force. Either of these strategies will limit Moscow's ability to pursue a country-wide pattern of reform, and both could represent a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Except for his actions in Chechnya, Yeltsin during his presidency tolerated both diversity and autonomy across the Russian Federation, arrangements that limited Moscow's power but purchased a certain amount of stability, decentralization, and popular control. Now Putin, whose actions in Chechnya have been far more brutal than Yeltsin's ever were, has decided to rein in the regions. But his 13 May decree seems more likely to set the center and periphery on a new collision course, one that may threaten even the limited moves toward democracy and federalism Yeltsin sponsored. 16-05-00 Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
|
|
 |
|
 |
 |
|
All Rights Reserved.