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RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 72, 00-04-11Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next ArticleFrom: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>RFE/RL NEWSLINEVol. 4, No. 72, 11 April 2000CONTENTS[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
[C] END NOTE
[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA[01] ARMENIAN POLICE SEEK INTERPOL'S HELP IN LOCATING EX-MINISTERArmenia's Interior Ministry on 10 April formally requestedInterpol to help them locate and detain former Interior Minister Vano Siradeghian, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported. Siradeghian is believed to have fled the country after his fellow parliamentary deputies last week voted to allow him to be taken into custody until sentence is passed in his ongoing trial (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 4 and 7 April 2000). Siradeghian is charged with ordering several contract killings in 1992-1996. Meanwhile a senior member of the opposition Armenian Pan-National Movement, whose board Siradeghian heads, told RFE/RL that Siradeghian's home was searched on 8 April and some 20 of his close associates were briefly held for questioning. LF [02] DETAINED ARMENIAN PRESIDENTIAL AIDE MAY BE RELEASEDA Yerevancourt declined on 10 April a request from the Military Prosecutor's office to extend for two months the detention of presidential foreign policy adviser Aleksan Harutiunian, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported. Harutiunian was taken into custody in December and charged with "inciting" the 27 October parliament shootings in which eight senior officials were killed (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 21 December 1999). Harutiunian has repeatedly denied any involvement in the killings. LF [03] KARABAKH PARLIAMENT SETS ELECTION DATEMeeting in Stepanakert on8 April, the parliament of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic scheduled elections to a new 33-deputy legislature for 18 June, RFE/RL's Stepanakert correspondent reported. All seats will be contested in single-mandate constituencies. Deputies also approved the enclave's draft budget for 2000, which is largely dependent on loans and subsidies from Armenia. The budget envisages 15.4 billion drams ($29 million) in expenditures, but only 5.4 billion drams in revenues. LF [04] GEORGIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT OUTLINES PRIORITIESEduard Shevardnadzetold journalists in Tbilisi on 10 April, one day after his re- election, that he plans to reshuffle the government, firing corrupt ministers and possibly bringing opposition representatives into the cabinet, Caucasus Press reported. With some 80 percent of all ballots counted, Shevardnadze had 80.4 percent of the vote, compared with 16.6 percent for his closest rival, Djumber Patiashvili, AP reported. Turnout was officially estimated at 68 percent, although a representative of the Georgian NGO Fair Elections disputed that figure, claiming his organization has documentary evidence that the actual figure was far lower, Interfax reported. Shevardnadze also denied on 10 April that during their talks in Batumi on 6 April, he and Adjar Supreme Council Chairman Aslan Abashidze had discussed the latter's election participation or had reached any preliminary agreement on regulating the strained relations between the central Georgian government and Adjaria. LF [05] INTERNATIONAL MONITORS CRITICIZE GEORGIAN ELECTION VIOLATIONSIna preliminary statement issued in Tbilisi on 10 April, the OSCE election observers' mission expressed concern about violations of voting procedure and the vote count, AP and Reuters reported. Those irregularities included ballot stuffing, tampering with votes and protocols, denying access to election observers, and the unauthorized presence of police at polling stations. The statement also said that the Georgian authorities "did not behave impartially and gave strong support to the incumbent." Noting that an ambiguous election law had been applied selectively in many cases, it called for a vigorous investigation of election- related breaches of the criminal code. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which also monitored the vote at some 600 polling stations, said it witnessed no "major violations," according to AP. Shevardnadze, too, denied any "serious violations," while Patiashvili claimed massive fraud. LF [06] RENEGADE GEORGIAN COLONEL DEMANDS INDEPENDENCE FOR MINGRELIAColonel Akaki Eliava, who led the abortive insurrection inwestern Georgia in October 1998 (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 20 and 21 October 1998), has demanded either independence or formal autonomous status for the west Georgian region of Mingrelia during President Shevardnadze's second presidential term, Caucasus Press reported on 11 April citing "Alia." Eliava said that the Georgian Central Electoral Commission's claim that 90 percent of the region's electorate cast their ballots is a lie and that the true figure does not exceed 10 percent. Eliava had earlier pledged his support for Patiashvili. LF [07] TRIAL OF FORMER KAZAKH PREMIER'S BODYGUARDS OPENSTwo bodyguardsof former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin went on trial in Almaty on 10 April on charges of illegal possession of arms, RFE/RL's correspondent in the former capital reported (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 22 December 1999 and 24 February 2000). Both men say they are innocent of those charges, which they claim are politically motivated. On 11 April, Amirzhan Qosanov, a leading member of Kazhegeldin's Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan, said the two accused were subjected to psychological pressure during the pre-trial investigation. LF [08] KAZAKHSTAN OIL EXPORT PLANS DETAILEDNurlan Balghymbaev, whoheads Kazakhstan's state oil company Kazakhoil, told Turan on 10 April that Kazakhstan considers the Caspian pipeline across the Russian Federation to Novorossiisk to be the "priority route" for oil exports. That pipeline is due to be completed next year. He added that Kazakhstan has reached agreement with Russia's Transneft to export approximately 1 million tons of crude via the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline. Balghymbaev said that Kazakhstan would not produce enough oil to require access to the planned Baku-Ceyhan export pipeline before 2008. He said only oil from offshore deposits where extraction has not yet begun would be exported by that route. Many experts believe that Azerbaijan alone cannot extract enough crude to render Baku-Ceyhan commercially viable. Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev said in Baku on 8 April that Kazakhstan will export no more than 2 million tons of oil by rail from Baku to Batumi in 2000 because Azerbaijan's rail transport tariffs are too high, according to Caucasus Press. LF [09] TURKISH PRESIDENT CANCELS VISIT TO KAZAKHSTANAn official visitto Astana on 12 April by Turkish President Suleyman Demirel has been cancelled, Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister Yerlan Idrisov told journalists on 10 April. Idrisov said that during talks in Baku last week on the sidelines of the Turkic summit, Demirel had accepted an invitation from President Nazarbaev to visit Kazakhstan as a private individual after his presidential term expires in May. LF [10] KAZAKHSTAN DENIES UZBEK SMUGGLING CHARGESKazakhstan'sambassador to Tashkent, Umurzak Uzbekov, told journalists in Tashkent on 7 April that Uzbek allegations that a truck that entered Uzbekistan from Kazakhstan on 30 March was carrying a radio-active cargo are groundless, Reuters and ITAR-TASS reported. Uzbek officials had said that the truck was carrying 10 containers of a radioactive substance (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 3 and 4 April 2000). Uzbekov said that the lorry was bearing scrap metal, part of which had been contaminated by radioactivity. LF [11] KYRGYZ PROTESTS CONTINUESome 100 protesters in Bishkek continueto demand the release of arrested opposition Ar-Namys party leader Feliks Kulov, RFE/RL's bureau in the Kyrgyz capital reported on 10 April. The next day, opposition parties appealed to Kulov to abandon the hunger strike he began two weeks earlier. Also on 11 April, some 300 people staged a picket in the southern town of Batken to protest a local court ruling annulling the parliamentary election victory in Batken of opposition politician Dosbol Nur Uulu. LF [12] NEW MUFTI, PROSECUTOR-GENERAL APPOINTED IN KYRGYZSTANAbdysatar-hadji Mazhitov resigned as Kyrgyzstan's chief mufti at an "urgent" meeting of the Council of Ulemas in Bishkek on 8 April, RFE/RL's bureau in the Kyrgyz capital reported. Kimsanbai-hadji Abdyrakmanov was elected as his successor. Abdyrakmanov had served in that post until his dismissal and replacement by Mazhitov in December 1996. Under a presidential decree published on 10 April, Asanbek Sharshenaliev was dismissed from the post of prosecutor-general, which he had held since 1993. Chu Oblast governor Kubat Kozhonaliev was appointed to replace him. LF [13] RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL AIDE VISITS UZBEKISTANOn a one-day visitto Tashkent on 10 April, Sergei Yastrzhembskii called Uzbekistan Russia's "strategic ally" and pledged that Russia will help Tashkent rebuff any attack on its territory by international terrorists, Russian agencies reported. Yastrzhembskii's talks with President Islam Karimov focused on joint measures to combat terrorism, banditry, religious extremism, and drug trafficking; the situation in Central Asia; and bilateral relations. LF [B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE[14] KUCAN BEGINS TALKS ON NEW SLOVENIAN GOVERNMENTPresident MilanKucan discussed the formation of a new government with outgoing Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek and parliamentary speaker Marjan Podobnik, who heads the People's Party (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 10 April 2000). No statement was issued after the meeting, which took place on 10 April in Ljubljana, AP reported. Podobnik and Lojze Peterle of the Christian Democrats are willing to form a coalition government with the rightist Social Democrats, but the three parties would be three seats short of a parliamentary majority of 46. The far-right National Party is willing to provide the necessary three additional votes but on the condition that it receives the Interior Ministry. Podobnik and Peterle stress that they would like the National Party's support but will not accept any conditions. Peterle said that "it would be better to have new elections than [Zmago] Jelincic as interior minister." Observers suggest that new elections in June or July are the most like way out of the apparent deadlock. PM [15] POLITICAL CRISIS TO AFFECT SLOVENIA'S EU TIMETABLE?A spokesmanfor the EU Commission said in Brussels on 10 April that Commissioner Guenter Verheugen, who is in charge of matters pertaining to EU expansion, has postponed a visit to Slovenia from 16 April to an unspecified date in May. The spokesman added that the "visit would be overshadowed by [domestic political] events, so we do not think this is the best time to go," Reuters reported. Many Slovenian political observers and business leaders are concerned lest a prolonged government crisis delay Slovenia's timetable for EU admission. To stay on schedule, the parliament must pass some 60 pieces of legislation by the end of the year 2000. Some business leaders also expressed concern that the government crisis could hold up a major privatization program involving the two largest banks, Telekom, some large insurance firms, and several power companies. PM [16] SLOVENIAN SECRET SERVICE BUGGED BISHOPWorkers found severalmicrophones planted in the offices of Maribor Bishop Franc Kramberger and one of his aides, Vatican Radio reported on 10 April. The listening devices were discovered in September 1999 just before the visit by Pope John Paul II. Church officials did not publicize the discovery until the fall of the Drnovsek government lest the news spoil attempts to improve Church-state relations, the broadcast added. The Slovenian leadership includes many former Communists and others who fear that the Roman Catholic Church wants to regain the wealth and political power it enjoyed before 1945. Slovenian society after 45 years of communism is largely secular. PM [17] MESIC PROPOSES CROATIAN PRESIDENTIAL REFORMPresident StipeMesic sent a document on 10 April to Prime Minister Ivica Racan and parliamentary speaker Zlatko Tomcic in which Mesic outlined his proposals to curtail the powers of the presidency. The suggestions go far to reduce the sweeping powers of the late President Franjo Tudjman in keeping with the wishes of all political parties. Under his proposals, Mesic would remain commander-in-chief of the armed forces, play a role in shaping foreign policy, and appoint the chiefs of the intelligence services. Mesic has repeatedly charged that the government wants to reduce his powers to a ceremonial level and humiliate him personally. He argues that the president needs to retain several key functions as a check on the government. The government is preparing its own proposals. PM [18] TUDJMAN BACKER OUSTED AT CROATIAN TELEVISIONThe governingcouncil of Croatian Television (HTV) voted on 10 April to sack Obrad Kosovac as editor-in-chief of television programming, "Jutarnji list" reported. He will be replaced by Neda Ritz, who previously supervised HTV's cultural broadcasts. She stresses that HTV must become a public broadcaster on the West European model. Under Kosovac and others in the previous management, HTV was a mouthpiece of Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). PM [19] CROATIAN STRIKE ENDSManagement paid workers at the Pikagricultural enterprise some $950,000 in back wages on 10 April (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 10 April 2000). The workers called off their strike shortly before their planned blockage of the Zagreb- Budapest railway line, "Jutarnji list" reported. PM [20] BOSNIAN VOTE COUNT CONTINUESPreliminary local election resultsfrom 30 out of 145 Bosnian municipalities show the Serbian Democratic Party ahead in 11 of them. The HDZ leads in seven, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action in six, and the Social Democrats in three, "Oslobodjenje" reported on 11 April. Final results may take several weeks to tally because of some 500,000 ballots mailed in by refugees. Mail votes could reduce the lead of nationalist parties, especially in the Republika Srpska, where most refugee votes are from Muslims. PM [21] MILOSEVIC TAKES FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST MEDIAMore than 10,000persons demonstrated in Nis on 10 April after a court fined the independent "Narodne novine" some $7,000 at the black market rate, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. The daily wrote in February that the army has been increasing the number of call- ups. In Belgrade, Studio-B Television director Dragan Kojadinovic said that his station will have nothing further to do with the "judicial circus" by which the government fines the private and independent media, the "Los Angeles Times" reported. Kojadinovic stressed that his station will not pay a $15,000 fine stemming from a libel suit filed by Belgrade police chief Branko Djuric. The station, which is linked to Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), now faces the possible confiscation of its equipment. Elsewhere, a spokesman for the independent daily "Danas" told reporters that the government is closing off official sources of information to non-state media, Reuters reported. PM [22] BELGRADE'S ARMY, POLICE MAKE PLANSArmy Chief-of-Staff GeneralNebojsa Pavkovic met in Belgrade on 10 April with top officials of the Serbian Interior Ministry. They said in a statement that the agenda included "defining tasks for preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order of the country, as well as public order, peace, and the security of citizens' persons and property," RFR/RL's South Slavic Service reported. The document did not contain further details. PM [23] SERBIAN PRESIDENT UNDERGOES HEART SURGERYMilan Milutinovicunderwent a previously scheduled heart operation in Belgrade on 10 April, hospital spokesmen said. The operation took place "without complications," RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. PM [24] ROMANIA SEEKS HELP TO DEAL WITH FLOODSDefense Minister SorinFrunzaverde on 10 April said his country has asked an ad hoc crisis center at NATO's headquarters in Brussels to assist Bucharest in dealing with massive floods in the northwestern part of the country, Reuters and Rompres reported. Seven people have died and more than 60,000 hectares of farmland have been damaged in massive floods caused by heavy rains and melting snow over the last few days. Frunzaverde and Prime Minister Mugur Isarescu, who have been visiting the flooded regions, have blamed much of the flooding on the fact that work on harnessing rivers has been neglected over the past 10 to 15 years. President Emil Constantinescu has called a meeting of the country's Supreme Defense Council for 11 April. VG [25] ROMANIA TO DEMAND EXTRADITION OF SENTENCED GENERALThe BucharestMilitary Tribunal on 10 April asked Justice Minister Valeriu Stoica to start extradition procedures for General Victor Stanculescu, who has been sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in quashing the anti-communist uprising in Timisoara in December 1989 (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 28 February 2000), RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported. Stanculescu is believed to be in the U.K., where he was undergoing medical treatment at the time of his sentencing. General Mihai Chitac, who was also sentenced to 15 years, has begun serving his sentence and is in a prison hospital. Chitac's lawyer said he will demand that his client be released on health grounds. MS [26] FORMER ROMANIAN PREMIER'S PARTY REGISTEREDThe Bucharest appealscourt on 10 April overturned an Bucharest municipal tribunal's ruling not to register the Popular Party headed by former Premier Radu Vasile (see "RFE/RL "Newsline," 13 March 2000), Mediafax reported. That decision is final. In related news, the parties and civic organizations belonging to the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) have signed new protocols for the local and parliamentary elections. The protocol on local elections stipulates that the National Peasant Party Christian Democratic and the Romanian Ecologist Party will run as part of the CDR in the local ballot, while the National Liberal Party and the Romanian Ecological Federation will each run on separate lists. All four parties are to run as part of the CDR in the parliamentary elections. MS [27] ROMANIAN NATIONAL BANK REBUKES STANDARD & POOR'SThe NationalBank on 10 April said Romania does not run the risk of being unable to service its foreign debt "in the foreseeable future," RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported. The bank said its reserves in hard currency and gold exceed $2.5 billion. The bank was responding to a 27 March warning by the international rating agency Standard & Poor's that that Romania, along with the Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe, might default on its foreign debt this year. MS [28] MOLDOVA MUST MEET IMF CONDITIONS BY 12 APRILMoldovan PrimeMinister Dumitru Braghis said on Moldovan Television over the weekend that the IMF will decide on 12 April whether to send a mission to Moldova, Infotag reported on 10 April. Braghis said that by then, the parliament must pass five bills that the IMF has set as a condition for extending new credits to Moldova. The IMF has already extended the deadline for the passage of that legislation from the end of March (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 31 March 2000). Parliamentary speaker Dumitru Diakov said on 10 April that the legislature cannot meet that deadline. He said this means Moldova may not be able to meet its foreign-debt payment commitments this year. VG [29] MOLDOVAN PRESIDENT AGAIN REJECTS RUMOR ABOUT RUSSIAN BASESPetruLucinschi told the OSCE's mission head in Moldova, William Hill, on 10 April that he categorically refutes all rumors that his country plans to allow Russia to set up a military base in the breakaway region of Transdniester (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 7 and 10 April 2000). VG [C] END NOTE[30] THE ANGOLA VARIANTBy Paul GobleGovernments of countries that earn most of their income through the export of a single raw material often are unwilling to promote human rights or social welfare. But at the same time, these states are very much prepared to spend money on the military, both to justify their existence and to keep the current authorities in power. And because their exports--especially oil--are so valuable to many other governments, these states often are able to escape significant criticism of their policies, a pattern that the historical record suggests may create precisely the instability that both the exporters and those who purchase their raw materials say they want to avoid. That is the clear lesson of recent developments in the African country of Angola, but it is one that appears to have a clear application to several post-Soviet states that are benefiting from the recent rise in oil prices to finance military activities or which hope to power their economic development through the export of petroleum or some other raw materials. According to an analysis published on 9 April by "New York Times" journalist Blaine Harden, Angola suffers from "the paradox of plenty": Its enormous and apparently increasing oil wealth has permitted the government in Luanda to enrich itself while allowing the majority of Angolans to fall into ever more terrible poverty. And this wealth has also allowed the government there to escape serious criticism from Western oil purchasers. As a result, Harden points out, the Angolan government has become ever more corrupt, its reliance on security forces to keep the population in line has increased, and its need to continue a military campaign against insurgents, rather than seek an accommodation with them, has grown. And because of these factors, Harden notes, Angola has remained "impervious to the greater openness now seen across much of Africa." Harden's conclusions about Angola clearly apply elsewhere as well. Buoyed by an increase rise in oil prices and the income generated for the Russian government, Moscow conducted a war in Chechnya that it could not otherwise have paid for. Moreover, with this new source of income, the Russian authorities became dismissive of any Western criticism by the West, noting that they can make it without Western loans. Last week, for example, one Russian official after another noted that Moscow would like to get more assistance from the West but that it would not significantly change its policies in order to do so. Several Russian commentators argued that Europeans would soon be forced to moderate their criticism of Moscow's Chechen policy because they need Russian gas and oil. But there is an even more disturbing parallel with the Angola variant: Ever more Russian officials are calling for building up the country's national defense, even though it faces no clear threat and even though money spent on the military will not be available to alleviate the social and economic problems of the population as a whole. As in Angola, such a strategy may be popular initially but is likely to lose support over time, potentially leading the government to rely on the constant generation of new enemies to justify this approach and possibly to employ ever more repressive means to keep itself in power. In several other post-Soviet states that are or hope to become major exporters of oil or gas, the danger of an Angola variant may be even greater. In all too many cases, the governments of these countries have not adopted policies designed to diversify the economy and spread the wealth, as some oil exporters in other parts of the world have begun to do. Instead, they have chosen to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few, an arrangement that almost always contributes to both corruption and repression in the short term and to instability over the longer haul. Moreover, many of these countries have escaped the kind of Western criticism for their social policies and human rights shortcomings that neighboring countries without oil to export have regularly received. And that in turn has made both the exporters and the non-exporters more cynical than ever about whatever human rights criticism there has been. Many people in the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states have regularly talked about a "Latin American variant" for their futures: an authoritarian regime that could manage the transition from instability to a more open and just future. But the Angola variant serves as a reminder that any reliance on authoritarianism supported by the export of raw materials can have another and much less positive result, one that neither the exporters nor the importers of these raw materials ultimately are likely to be satisfied with. 11-04-00 Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
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