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RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 12, 00-01-18Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next ArticleFrom: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>RFE/RL NEWSLINEVol. 3, No. 12, 18 January 2000CONTENTS[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
[C] END NOTE
[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA[01] ARMENIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CALLS FOR PRETERM PRESIDENTIALELECTIONSNewly-elected Armenian Communist Party First Secretary Vladimir Darpinian told journalists in Yerevan on 17 January that his party advocates holding pre-term presidential elections in order to "help restore political stability" in the wake of the 27 October parliament shootings, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported. But he added that the new poll should be held only after amendments are made to the existing constitution. Darpinian also said that his party will cooperate closely with the majority Miasnutyun coalition to push through constitutional reform and will propose its own amendments. He also spoke in favor of continued military cooperation with Russia. LF [02] FORMER ARMENIAN INTERIOR MINISTER IMPLICATED IN MURDERAformer commander of Armenia's Interior Ministry troops told a Yerevan court on 14 January that former Interior Minister Vano Siradeghian ordered the murder of two police officers six years ago after they failed to assassinate a Moscow-based Armenian businessman in 1993, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported. The former commander also said that leading members of the former ruling Armenian Pan-National Movement also commissioned other murders, including those of a local government official and the head of Armenia's rail network. Siradeghian's role in the killings was to "ensure the perpetrators' impunity," he went on. Siradeghian denies the charges, which he claims are politically motivated. LF [03] AZERBAIJANI FOREIGN MINISTER CALLS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONSWITH IRANVilayet Guliev told Turan on 17 January that he believes Azerbaijan should "revise its attitude towards Iran" and work for warmer bilateral relations. He added that Azerbaijan has always advocated the export of its oil by multiple pipelines, and argued that the implementation of the planned Baku-Ceyhan project does not exclude construction of a fourth pipeline, in addition to those via Russia and Georgia, to export crude via Iran. Guliev also did not exclude the routing of an oil export pipeline via Armenia if Armenian forces are withdrawn from occupied Azerbaijani territory. He did not specify whether the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is included in that category. On 14 January, "Yeni Azerbaycan," the newspaper of the eponymous ruling political party, noted a "lukewarm spring" in bilateral relations, as evidenced by the long postponed and now reportedly imminent visit to Iran of Azerbaijan's president, Heidar Aliev. LF [04] UN MILITARY OBSERVERS ATTACKED IN ABKHAZIATwo members ofthe UN Observer force deployed in western Georgia were attacked late on 17 January in Abkhazia's Gali Raion by four unidentified masked men who seized their jeep, Caucasus Press reported. One of the two observers claimed that the attackers spoke Mingrelian. LF [05] GEORGIA, RUSSIA DISCUSS ENERGY, DEBTSOn a one-day visit toTbilisi on 17 January, Unified Energy Systems (UES) Chairman Anatolii Chubais met with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of State Vazha Lortkipanidze, and Fuel and Energy Minister Davit Mirtskhulava, Caucasus Press and ITAR-TASS reported. Chubais and Mirtskhulava signed a protocol on cooperation whereby Russia will convert $36.25 million of Georgia's total $45.22 million debt for energy supplies into Georgia's foreign debt. The remainder will be paid by the end of this year by Georgian energy companies. UES and Georgia's Fuel and Energy Ministry will also cooperate on construction of a power line linking the Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Turkish energy systems. UES will also participate in the upcoming privatization of Georgian energy facilities. LF [06] KAZAKH OFFICIAL SAYS JEWELRY COLLECTION CAMPAIGN WAS'MISTAKE'Almaty Oblast Governor Zamanbek Nurkadilov told Kazakhstan's state television on 16 January that the campaign launched in June 1999 to collect gold and silver jewelry and cash donations from the population "was his personal mistake," Interfax reported. Launching that initiative, Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev had said it was intended to shore up the country's sinking foreign currency reserves following the de facto devaluation of the tenge (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 4 and 7 June 1999). Nurkadilov admitted that the campaign "had not worked." On 17 January he told journalists that he has issued a decree ordering that the jewelry and cash donations, valued at 50 million tenges ($350,000) be returned to the donors, RFE/RL's Almaty correspondent reported. LF [07] NEW POLITICAL ALLIANCES TAKE SHAPE IN KYRGYZSTANTheleadership of the People's Republican Party and the Party To Support the Poor, Agricultural and Industrial Workers announced in Bishkek on 17 January that the two parties have formed a bloc, named Manas, to contend the 20 February parliamentary poll, RFE/RL's bureau in the Kyrgyz capital reported. Two days earlier, a spokesman for the Agrarian Party similarly announced that that party and the Party of Farmers will form an electoral alliance and field a combined party list of nine candidates to contest the seats in the new parliament to be allocated under the proportional system. That list will be headed by Akazbek Abdrashitov, a member of the presidential administration. A spokesman for the OSCE told an RFE/RL correspondent on 18 January that preparations for the poll indicate that it will meet OSCE basic standards for a democratic election. LF [08] KYRGYZSTAN'S SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS RULING AGAINST OPPOSITIONNEWSPAPERMeeting on 14 January, Kyrgyzstan's Supreme Court left in force the verdict handed down by a Bishkek district court last April against the opposition newspaper "Res Publica," RFE/RL's Bishkek bureau reported on 15 January. That court had fined the paper 200,000 som ($6,670) for insulting the honor and dignity of Amanbek Karypkulov, President of Kyrgyzstan's National Television and Radio Corporation (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 1 April 1999). On 12 January 1999 the paper had published an open letter by 20 employees of the corporation to President Askar Akaev, Prime Minister Jumabek Ibraimov, and the speakers of both chambers of parliament protesting that Karypkulov was restricting media freedom. The Bishkek City Court upheld the district court ruling (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 3 May 1999). "Res Publica" editor Zamira Sydykova said the paper will now appeal to the Constitutional Court. LF [09] UN ENVOY CONTINUES TALKS ON TAJIK PEACE PROCESSIvo Petrov,who is the special representative in Tajikistan of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, traveled to Moscow on 17 January for talks with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on the implementation of the 1997 Tajik peace agreement, of which Russia is one of the guarantors. The final stage of the peace agreement entails parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for 27 February. Petrov discussed the ongoing election campaign in Dushanbe last week with President Imomali Rakhmonov, opposition leader Said Abdullo Nuri, and Central Electoral Commission Chairman Mirzoali Boltuev, Asia Plus-Blitz reported. Those discussions raised the question of extending the UN involvement in the Tajik peace process after the election of the new parliament. Speaking in Dushanbe on 17 January, Rakhmonov expressed confidence that the new parliament will be "a truly professional supreme legislative body," ITAR-TASS reported. LF [10] TAJIKISTAN, UZBEKISTAN SIGN ECONOMIC AGREEMENTSA visitingUzbek government delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Lerik Ahmetov signed two cooperation agreements in Dushanbe on 14 January, Asia Pluz-Blitz reported three days later. Under the first agreement, Uzbekistan will deliver to Tajikistan in 2000 natural gas to the value of some $25 million at a price of $50 per 1,000 cubic meters, in payment for transit of Uzbek cargo via Tajikistan's Leninabad region, according to ITAR-TASS. The second agreement is on cooperation in the use of water and energy resources. LF [B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE[11] WHY NO POLICE REPORT ON ARKAN KILLING?Belgrade police stillhave not issued a statement on the murder of indicted war criminal Zeljko Raznatovic "Arkan," "Danas" reported on 18 January (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 17 January 2000). Conflicting reports have emerged in media close to the regime regarding the number of killers, whether Arkan appeared to have known any of them, and whether one was wounded and is now in hospital. Budimir Babovic, who is a former officer of Interpol, told the private Beta news agency that "if we do not soon receive a precise police statement as to who is behind the assassination, one should then ask the question as to whether the police are hiding the facts about the murder or maybe because they are behind it." Vladan Batic, who is a leader of the opposition Alliance for Change, said that Serbia is increasingly coming to resemble Colombia as far as the rule of law is concerned. Observers note that the regime is likely to try to obscure the facts by floating a number of conspiracy theories in the media. PM [12] SERBIAN OPPOSITION MAYORS DISCUSS OIL PROGRAMThe mayors ofNis and Pirot, Zoran Zivkovic and Tomislav Panajotovic, are slated to hold talks with EU officials in Skopje on 18 January, "Danas" reported. On the agenda is whether Brussels will continue to expand its Energy for Democracy program, through which it has provided some heating oil for the two opposition-run towns. The opposition wants the EU to expand the program to include additional cities, including some controlled by the ruling coalition. Brussels appears reluctant to launch such an ambitious project (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 13 January 2000). PM [13] SERBIAN POLICE SUMMON VOJVODINA POLITICIANPolice havesummoned Nenad Canak of the opposition League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina for an "informative discussion" on 18 January, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. The term is usually a euphemism for an interrogation. Canak told reporters that he has no idea why he has been called in. PM [14] CROATIA, EU UPBEAT ON PROSPECTS FOR BETTER TIES...EUspokesman Ricardo Levi said in Brussels on 17 January that the visit to Croatia by Commission President Romano Prodi three days earlier demonstrated "on both sides high hopes of a dramatic change in the relationship between the EU and Croatia, with far-reaching consequences." He added that the new Croatian government "is fully committed to Europe," Reuters reported. Levi stressed that he hopes that the changes in Croatia will have a favorable impact on Serbia, which is now becoming surrounded by a "circle of democracy." PM [15] ...AMID CAUTION AGAINST EUPHORIACroatian Ambassador to theEU Janko Vranyczany-Dobrinovic told "Jutarnji list" of 18 January that high-level visits and good intentions will not be enough to help Croatia make up for nine years of lost time in developing its ties to Brussels. He said that the new government, like the post-Meciar government in Slovakia, will have to draw up a precise program, which EU officials will then scrutinize carefully. He added that the new government must make very clear what it wants and what it is prepared to do. It will have to speed up the return of Serbian refugees, fully implement the Dayton agreement, and fully cooperate with the Hague-based war crimes tribunal. PM [16] MESIC: SOLVE PREVLAKA ISSUE WITH MONTENEGROStipe Mesic,whom polls suggest is the current front-runner in the 24 January Croatian presidential election, told Montenegro's Montena Television that Zagreb and Podgorica should solve the dispute over the Prevlaka peninsula directly between them, "Danas" reported on 18 January. Mesic stressed that both Croatia and Montenegro are on their way to European integration, and that they should deal with this outstanding issue without recourse to the Belgrade regime. Prevlaka is Croatian territory but controls the entrance to Montenegro's Kotor Bay, which is currently the site of Yugoslavia's only deep-water naval base (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 14 January 2000). The bay provides one of the Mediterranean's great natural harbors and has attracted the interest of regional powers for centuries. PM [17] BOSNIAN UPPER HOUSE BLASTS LOWER HOUSEDeputies of the upperhouse of the joint parliament held a half-hour session in Sarajevo on 17 January in which they approved 18 international agreements signed by the Bosnian authorities. The deputies were unable to deal with any additional measures because the lower house, in which nationalist parties often block legislation, had not acted on them. The upper house deputies passed a resolution dubbing the lower house "the least effective institution of the [joint] government," RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. Meanwhile in Banja Luka, several Bosnian Serb deputies to the lower house held a press conference to protest the decision by the international community's Wolfgang Petritsch to set up a joint border police force (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 14 January 2000). The deputies called Petritsch's move "undemocratic." PM [18] VETERAN ROMANIAN POLITICIAN DEADNational Peasant PartyChristian Democratic (PNTCD) Deputy Chairman Ion Ratiu died in London on 17 January of cancer, Romanian media reported. Ratiu was a leader of the Romanian anti-communist emigration. He returned to Romania after the fall of communism and ran for president in 1990. He was also the owner of the daily "Cotidianul," whose editorial line has often been criticized by the PNTCD. Although a deputy leader of the party, Ratiu had been very much relegated by the PNTCD to ceremonial positions in the last years. MS [19] ROMANIAN RULING PARTY TO ELECT NEW BUREAUThe StandingBureau of the PNTCD on 17 January decided by a majority of votes that the party's Permanent Delegation is to elect a new Standing Bureau at its meeting later this month, RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported. The bureau thus overruled PNTCD chairman Ion Diaconescu, who earlier said he opposes the step in order to preserve party unity before the 2000 parliamentary elections. Diaconescu said at the end of the meeting that the new Standing Bureau will have an "interim mandate" and will be replaced by one to be elected by the PNTCD congress after the general elections. PNTCD deputy chairman Gabriel Tepelea announced that he will not seek re- election to the new bureau. MS [20] ROMANIA REHABILITATES ANTONESCU MINISTERNetta Gheron, whoserved as Finance Minister in the government headed by Ion Antonescu, was rehabilitated by the Supreme Court of Justice on 17 January, Mediafax reported. Gheron had been sentenced by the communist regime to ten years hard labor for "crimes against peace." MS [21] MOLDOVAN PRESIDENT POKERS ON ROMANIAN ELECTRICITY DEBT...President Petru Lucinschi on 17 January said that at nextweek's CIS summit in Moscow he will discuss with Russian leaders the possibility of replacing electricity imports from Romania with Russian imports if Moscow offers a lower price, Romanian radio reported. Romania has been threatening to cut supplies due to Moldova's $22 million debt and the failure of Chisinau to finalize an agreement whereby the Romanians would take control of the Tirex-Petrol Moldovan company in exchange for the debt. The issue was also discussed last weekend by the countries' premiers when Dumitru Barghis and Mugur Isarescu both participated in ceremonies marking 150 years since the birth of national (for both countries) poet Mihai Eminescu. MS [22] ...SAYS NO REFUGEE STATUS FOR CHECHENSMoldova considers theChechen issue to be a Russian internal affair and will not grant refugee status to those arriving from Chechnya, President Lucinschi, cited by ITAR-TASS, said on 17 January. "It would be strange if we, who suffer ourselves as a result of separatism, would encourage separatism in other countries," he said. Lucinschi added that he has instructed the Foreign Ministry, as well as the Interior Ministry, to clarify what he termed "misunderstandings" linked to the arrival of Chechen refugees. He said the Moldovan legislation on refugees was "imperfect," which led to the representative in Moldova of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees having issued documents that "exceed his powers." "With the help of the Russian authorities," he said, Moldova will find out "who is who" among those who arrived from Chechnya. MS [23] BULGARIAN PRESIDENT VETOES LIBEL LAWPetar Stoyanov on 17January announced he has vetoed a law passed by the parliament last week that imposed heavy fines on journalists found guilty of libel or slander, dpa and AP reported. The parliament on 12 January abolished imprisonment for libel or slander, but replaced the penalty with fines of up to 30,000 leva (about $15,500). Stoyanov said the fines were "excessively high compared to the low income of journalists." He spoke before departing for a three-day visit to Israel. MS [C] END NOTE[24] Odd Men OutBy Julie A. CorwinNow that the State Duma elections are over and Russian presidential elections are scheduled for 26 March, national leaders' courtship of their regional counterparts has skidded to an abrupt halt--causing the presidents and governors of Russia's 89 regions to try to establish good relations with the likely winner of presidential elections, acting President Vladimir Putin. So far, leaders in the Bashkortostan and Tatarstan republics, Khabarovosk and Altai krais, as well as Nizhnii Novgorod and Novgorod oblasts have declared their support for Putin. All those leaders are--or were--members of groups that competed against the Putin-backed bloc, Unity, in Duma elections. Those regional leaders in the most awkward position vis-a-vis Moscow may not be the ones who backed the losing parties, but those whose verbal endorsements fell on deaf ears. Overall, regional leaders who supported Unity had better success winning their populations' votes than Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) or Communist leaders, raising the possibility that the success of Unity in the elections had more to do with Putin's rising popularity than the governors' backing. Certain leaders who supported former Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov's OVR, such as the presidents of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Ingushetia, and Mordovia, managed to swing a plurality of voters in their region to the party. However, others backing OVR, such as Moscow Oblast Governor Anatolii Tyazhlov and Novosibirsk Governor Vitalii Mukha, couldn't even manage to get themselves re-elected let alone muster significant support for OVR. Similarly, in regions such as the republic of Karelia, Nizhnii Novgorod, Murmansk, Kirov, Irkutsk and Perm oblasts, and Khabarovsk Krai, the local governors' endorsements for OVR failed to generate more than 8 percent of support for that group. The lesson that national officials preparing for presidential elections may draw is to be more discriminating in their pursuit of regional officials' support and concentrate their resources on regional leaders with a proven election track record. Such a strategy may rule out wooing Yaroslavl, where Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov managed to arrange millions of dollars worth of financing from the Moscow city government for the area to construct an international hockey venue. In that oblast Unity, the Communist Party, and Union of Rightist Forces each captured more votes than OVR (see "RFE/RL Russian Federation Report," 5 May 1999). And it may also exclude Udmurtia, where the Moscow government agreed to buy electricity meters, medical equipment, and an experimental shipment of batteries for Moskvich car manufacturers from local factories seven months before elections. There, Unity attracted four times as many votes as OVR. With the discretion to disburse federal money and enforce tax laws, federal authorities are in a much better position than any opposition figure--such as Luzhkov--to pursue a policy of providing not just "carrots" but also wielding "sticks" against regional leaders. Although federal law establishes certain procedures for distributing revenues, in practice Finance Ministry officials appear to distribute monies to regions at will. For example, in 1996, when tax revenues fell significantly below projections, Russian regions received only about 60 percent of what was allocated to them by the federal budget but these cuts were not made across the board, according to Daniel Triesman, a political scientist at UCLA. Triesman found that some regions received exactly the amount budgeted, while others received hundreds or thousands of rubles per capita less and some even received a little bit more. He also discovered that regions whose leaders opposed or chose not to support the incumbent central politicians during the government crisis in 1993 and in elections in 1995 were rewarded or "appeased" with more budget money. If this pattern continues to hold, then leaders in Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Ingushetia, and Mordovia may find Moscow presenting them with inducements for their loyalty or "carrots" in the form of higher federal transfers. On the other hand, federal officials may find that Putin's impressive lead in public opinion surveys and continuing control over national media outlets, such as Russian Public Television, gives them the leeway to brandish the stick more than the carrot. Shortly after Duma elections results were tallied, Tax Minister Aleksandr Pochinok announced that the two oil companies in the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, Tatneft and Bashneft, are in danger of losing their access to crude export pipelines because of their overdue tax debts. Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev and Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov, both founding members of All Russia, were among the most effective in delivering the vote in their regions. In Tatarstan, 3 of 5 seats in single-mandate districts went to OVR candidates. In Bashkortostan, the rate was even better with 4 of the 5 seats going to the OVR. After Pochinok's announcement, Tatarstan's president, Mintimer Shaimiev, accused federal officials of engaging in "political pressure" (see "RFE/RL Russian Federation Report," 5 January 2000.) Acknowledging another area where his region is vulnerable to even more pressure, Shaimiev noted that revision of the power-sharing agreement between Tatarstan and the center would not be conducive to "stability" (see "RFE/RL Russian Federation Report," tk January 1999). With oil reserves and large, politically docile populations, the leaders of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are likely to find some kind of mutually agreeable arrangement with the center despite their "disloyalty." Perhaps the real odd men out may be those regional leaders who were disloyal to the center but whose voters still backed the Kremlin--such as Karelia and Yaroslavl. Those governors may scramble to support Putin now but will find that they are offering the center much too little much too late. 18-01-00 Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
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