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RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 79, 97-07-23Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next ArticleFrom: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>RFE/RL NEWSLINEVol. 1, No. 79, 23 July 1997CONTENTS[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
[C] END NOTE
[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA[01] GEORGIAN PRESIDENT OPPOSES "HASTY" DECISION ON ABKHAZ PEACEKEEPERSEduard Shevardnadze said on his return to Tbilisi from the U.S. on 22 July that the Georgian leadership will take no "hasty or light-headed" decisions on expelling the CIS peacekeepers after their mandate expires on 31 July, Russian media reported. But Tamaz Nadareishvili, chairman of the Abkhaz parliament in exile, has ordered Georgian volunteers to western Georgia to replace the CIS force now deployed along the internal border between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia, "Nezavisimaya gazeta" reported on 23 July. Lev Mironov, a Russian representative to UN-sponsored talks on the Abkhaz conflict that opened in Geneva on 23 July, told Interfax it will be difficult to avoid fresh violence if the peacekeepers leave. Citing an unnamed UN source, AFP reported that the talks will not address Abkhazia's future political status but are intended to secure agreement that neither side will renew hostilities after 31 July.[02] AZERBAIJANI SENTENCES ETHNIC ARMENIAN FOR ESPIONAGEA military court in Baku on 22 July handed down the death sentence to Karen Barashev on charges of spying for Armenia, an RFE/RL correspondent in Baku reported. Barashev, an Armenian who was born in Baku and served in the Soviet army in Azerbaijan, was recruited in Russia by Armenian intelligence, according to "Literaturnaya gazeta" on 16 July, quoting a senior member of President Heidar Aliev's administration. Barashev agreed to return to Azerbaijan, where he enlisted in an anti-aircraft unit and between 1993 and 1996 carried out systematic sabotage causing more than $1 million damage. Azerbaijani Security Minister Namik Abbasov has frequently commented that Russian, Turkish, Iranian, and Armenian agents are engaged in espionage in Azerbaijan. "Nezavisimaya gazeta" on 23 July quoted the head of the Public Relations Department of the Armenian National Security Ministry as saying that "you would think the sole aim of the world's intelligence services is to organize a coup in Azerbaijan."[03] ARMENIAN NUCLEAR POWER STATION CLOSED FOR MAINTENANCEThe nuclear power station at Medzamor was closed down on 22 July for two months, during which one-third of the nuclear fuel will be replaced and the security system upgraded, Armenian media reported. At a recent meeting with senior Armenian officials, including Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Hans Blix noted "considerable progress" in ensuring the safe exploitation of the plant, according to Noyan Tapan. Blix and Armenian Energy Minister Gagik Martirossyan also discussed the possibility of building a second nuclear power station in Armenia, Interfax reported on 17 July.[04] KAZAKH PRESIDENT CRITICIZES TAX, CUSTOMS OFFICIALSAt a 22 July session of the Kazakh Security Council, Nursultan Nazarbayev blasted the work of the State Committees on Taxation and Customs, RFE/RL correspondents in Almaty reported. According to Nazarbayev, "inappropriate work" of the two committees was responsible for the government losing an estimated 13 billion tenge (about $170 million). Nazarbayev also told the session that criminal proceedings have been initiated against 29 officials of the Taxation Committee and 22 officials from the Customs Committee.[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE[05] BOSNIAN SERB COURT BACKS PLAVSICThe Constitutional Court of the Republika Srpska met in Pale on 22 July and overruled the cabinet's objections to President Biljana Plavsic's decision to dissolve the parliament and call new elections. The court said the government has no business interfering in matters that the constitution clearly delegates to the president and to the legislature. Aside from the army's luke-warm backing for Plavsic, the decision marks the first time that a major institution of the Bosnian Serb state has taken the side of the embattled president. The court must now rule on the parliament's objections to Plavsic's decision dissolving the legislature and calling elections, an RFE/RL correspondent in Pale reported.[06] U.S. GENERAL CALLS FOR NEW GUIDANCE FOR CATCHING WAR CRIMINALSAir Force Brig. Gen. Robert Osterthaler said in Washington on 22 July that British SFOR troops acted within their mandate when they recently hunted down two Bosnian Serb war criminals. The senior military official added, however, that all NATO member states must agree on a "new political guidance" if the troops are to go after major figures such as Radovan Karadzic. Meanwhile in Bosnia, a grenade exploded outside the Brcko district office of Carlos Westendorp, the international community's chief representative in Bosnia.[07] MONTENEGRIN ELECTIONS SLATED FOR OCTOBERMontenegrin parliament speaker Svetozar Marovic has decided to call presidential elections for 5 October, the independent news agency Montena- faks reported from Podgorica on 22 July. Also in the Montenegrin capital, the parliament continued discussions of the recent election of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to the federal Yugoslav presidency. Most Montenegrin leaders charge that the election was rushed through the federal parliament before the Montenegrin legislature could discuss Milosevic's candidacy. Political observers say that Milosevic forced the early vote precisely in order to head off potential opposition from Podgorica. Milosevic was inaugurated on 23 July. The Montenegrin parliament also expressed its opposition to Milosevic's proposed changes to the federal constitution, which are aimed at strengthening his power over the republics.[08] U.S. FAVORS CONTINUED UN PRESENCE IN DISPUTED CROATIAN PENINSULAU.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson said in Skopje on 22 July that Washington regards Macedonia "as a source of regional stability." Earlier that day, he stated in Dubrovnik that UN monitors should stay on in southern Croatia's Prevlaka peninsula until Zagreb and Belgrade agree on its future. Prevlaka is Croatian territory, but it offers access to Yugoslavia's only naval base, which is located in Kotor Bay. President Tudjman has hinted that he would be willing to swap the peninsula for Bosnian Serb territory near Dubrovnik, but Croatian public opinion and the Bosnian federal government strongly oppose such a deal.[09] TUDJMAN SACKS LEADING GENERALSThe Croatian Defense Ministry on 22 July announced the retirement of three well-known generals--Ante Roso, Djuro Decak, and Ivan Korade--as well as the transfer of nine other top officers. No official reason was given for the changes. Independent media said, however, that the ousted officers were linked to war crimes or corruption and were sacrificed as part of President Tudjman's efforts to promote Croatia's admission to NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Since the Croatian armed forces were set up in 1991, Tudjman has tried to raise them to NATO standards of equipment, leadership, and training.[10] NEWS FROM FORMER YUGOSLAVIAA Vatican spokesman on 22 July denied that the Holy See is holding Ustasha gold from World War II (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 22 July 1997). In Sarajevo, representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is monitoring the Bosnian local elections slated for September, banned from the ballot in Brcko the top three candidates of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). This marks the second time that the OSCE has punished the Serbs for manipulating voter registration lists in the strategic north Bosnian town. The OSCE has forced Muslims and Croats off the ballot elsewhere. And in Kosovo, Radio Pristina said that storms have destroyed up to half the region's harvest.[11] LONG-RANGE MISSILES STOLEN IN ALBANIATop military officials said in Gjirokaster on 22 July that unidentified persons stole some 15 surface-to-surface and surface-to-air Chinese Silkworm-type missiles from an underground tunnel on 20 July. A Defense Ministry spokesman said on Albanian TV that an investigation is under way. An army commander told Reuters that "all the Kalashnikovs that have been looted are nothing compared to this." Military officials said they suspect that foreign or domestic "mafias" are behind the theft, but the officials did not rule out political motives. Meanwhile in Vlora, rival gangs fought on 21 July with anti-tank rockets, mortars, and machine guns. Local residents fled to underground shelters. News agencies said the fighting was the worst Vlora had seen since anarchy broke out in March. The international community had hoped that the June elections would end unrest.[12] ROMANIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF RESIGNSGen. Decebal Ilina, chief of the Military Intelligence Service, announced at a press conference in Bucharest on 22 July that he is resigning as of 1 August, RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported. He said he has completed four years in that post, adding that intelligence chiefs should not serve for decades, as was the case before and during the communist regime. Ilina rejected a recent statement by Premier Victor Ciorbea, who said the country's secret services must undergo a process of de-Sovietization. He said Romania's military intelligence had cut any ties with Warsaw Pact countries intelligence services in 1962. There is speculation among Romanian media that Ilinca's resignation is connected with the recent detention of a Swiss diplomat under suspicion of spying for Romania.[13] ROMANIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL UNDER INVESTIGATION...Also on 22 July, Radio Bucharest reported that Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) Gen. Dumitru Ciobanu, a former deputy director of the service, is under investigation by the military section of the Prosecutor-General's Office. He is suspected of having leaked secret information to unauthorized sources. The independent news agency AR-press says Ciobanu may be "a scapegoat" for SIE chief Ioan Talpes, who, according to as yet unconfirmed reports, has resigned and will be replaced by presidential counselor Catalin Harnagea. The same agency reports that the military section is investigating allegations that Talpes received $50,000 to use his influence for facilitating a bank loan to the former ruling party, the Party of Social Democracy in Romania.[14] ...WHILE INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL'S APPOINTMENT REVOKEDActing on instructions from President Emil Constantinescu, Costin Georgescu, the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), has revoked the appointment of Col. Gheorghe Atudoroaie as SRI chief for western Romania. Atudoroaie was acquitted by a Timisoara court for involvement in the reprisals against the anti-communist uprising in December 1989 in Timisoara. He had served in that city as deputy chief of the Securitate, the communist-era secret service.[15] MOLDOVAN PARLIAMENTARY UPDATEIn a declaration issued on 22 July, the 11 parliamentary deputies who quit the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova (PDAM) said that the party has "diverged" from the platform that ensured its election victory in the 1994 elections (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 22 July 1997). They also said that the dismissal of Dumitru Diacov as parliamentary deputy chairman was an "act of revenge" for his and other PDAM deputies' support of President Petru Lucinschi rather than Andrei Sangheli, the PDAM candidate in the presidential December 1996 elections. They explained that they did not back Sangheli because he had "discredited" the PDAM. They also noted that Diacov's dismissal demonstrates the PDAM faction's opposition to the reforms promoted by Lucinschi, according to RFE/RL's Chisinau bureau. Valentin Dolganiuc, the leader of the opposition Christian Democratic Popular Front, called the resignation of the 11 PDAM deputies "a political farce," Infotag reported.[16] RUSSIA OPPOSES UKRAINIAN OBSERVERS IN TRANSDNIESTERVladimir Ustinov, the Russian representative on the Joint Control Commission (JCC) in the Transdniester breakaway region, told the commission on 22 July that the military units in the security zone should be "gradually reduced" rather than bolstered by more observers. Ustinov made the remarks in connection with the possible arrival of Ukrainian peace keepers in the region. But Moldovan representative Vasile Sova said the arrival of the Ukrainian observers did not mean that Kyiv would be represented in the region by large military contingents, BASA-press reported. Rather, their presence was part and parcel of Ukraine's role as a mediator in the peace-keeping process.[C] END NOTE[17] ONE STATE, TWO FOREIGN POLICIES?by Liz FullerArmenia has traditionally considered itself, and been regarded by the international community, as Russia's closest ally in the Transcaucasus, not least because of the two countries' shared mistrust of Turkey. True, since coming to power in August 1990, the post-communist leadership of Levon Ter- Petrossyan has consistently sought to pursue a balanced foreign policy and to establish cordial relations with all neighboring states, including Turkey. Russia nonetheless remained the primary focus, and relations between Yerevan and Moscow were so harmonious that, during his visit to Armenia in fall 1994, Russian Federation Council chairman Vladimir Shumeiko was hard put to name a single issue on which the two countries' leaderships disagreed. (This is not to suggest that Armenia's sovereignty is in any way subservient to Russia: it behaves as a "model geo-political citizen" but not as a satellite.) From Moscow's standpoint, the most crucial component of this "special relationship" is military cooperation. Under a series of bilateral agreements signed over the past few years, Russia maintains a military base in Armenia, and the countries' armed forces regularly conduct joint maneuvers. In terms of regional geo-politics, Russia and Armenia, together with Iran, were until recently perceived as a counterweight to the Western-oriented axis that originally comprised Azerbaijan and Turkey. Over the past year, however, Georgia and Ukraine have aligned themselves with Azerbaijan. Two factors contributed to this configuration change: the search for the economically most viable export route for Azerbaijan's Caspian oil that bypasses Russian territory, and the ongoing debate over NATO's eastward expansion, which offered the (admittedly long-term) possibility of alternative security guarantees to the CIS Collective Security Treaty. The views of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine on both those issues have not always corresponded to those of the Turkish leadership. Georgia and Ukraine propose pumping Azerbaijan's Caspian oil to the Georgian terminal of Supsa, shipping it by tanker to Odessa, and transporting it by pipeline from there to Western Europe. Ankara, for its part, is intent on building a major export pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan in southeastern Turkey. As for NATO expansion, Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller threatened in January to veto acceptance of any new NATO members unless concrete assurances were given that Ankara would finally be granted entry into the EU. The emergence of the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine axis appears to have served as the catalyst for a revision of Armenia's traditionally Russia-oriented foreign and security policies. (This policy shift may also have been prompted by apprehension that some circles within the Russian leadership who want Azerbaijan's oil to be exported via the Baku-Grozny-Tikhoretsk- Novorossiisk pipeline would make major concessions to Baku that could negatively impact on the search for an acceptable solution to the Karabakh conflict.) Yerevan has in recent months engaged in an intensive dialogue with Kyiv. The Armenian Foreign Ministry has also drafted a new security doctrine that provides for military cooperation with Russia and the CIS as well as for Armenia's more active participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program; a role for Armenia, together with international organizations, in guaranteeing the security of Nagorno-Karabakh; and the proposed creation of a sub-regional security and arms control system. (In this context Armenia is likely to support the recently resurrected Russian proposal to beef up the security component of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Greek Defense Minister Apostolos Tsohatzopoulos may have had this in mind when he commented after recent talks in Yerevan with his Armenian counterpart, Vazgen Sargsian, that "it is necessary to establish a new body of collective security, proceeding from the existence of regional institutions.") In late April, the Armenian Foreign Ministry advised postponing ratification of a treaty permitting Russia to maintain a military base in Armenia. In a document circulated among parliamentary deputies and subsequently published in the independent newspaper "Molorak," the ministry argued that by formalizing the Russian military presence in Armenia, the treaty limited the amount of heavy weaponry that Yerevan would be permitted under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. If Russia withdrew its troops, Armenia would not be automatically entitled to increase its arms holdings and could therefore find itself vulnerable to attack. However, this reasoning failed to convince the parliament, which ratified the treaty by a large majority. To interpret this episode simply as a clash between two foreign-policy visions--one traditional and static and the other evolving in response to a more complex and changing geo-strategic environment--would overlook three key points. First, the phenomenon of two apparently divergent foreign policy orientations reflects the growing professionalization of the foreign- policy establishments of the former Soviet republics and, as such, is not unique to Armenia. Second, the debate focuses on the priority to be given to Armenia's relations with Russia; that is, it is a question of degree, rather than of two mutually exclusive alternatives. Third, both these orientations have their supporters within the Armenian leadership and the opposition, as does the proposal that Armenia accede to the Russia-Belarus Union. Which vision prevails will likely be determined not by the relative strength of the domestic political lobbies but by the nature and extent of the long-term security guarantees provided for Nagorno-Karabakh under any proposed political settlement of the conflict. Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
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