YDS 11/28 INTERVIEW: MILAN MILUTINOVIC

Yugoslav Daily Survey Directory

From: ddc@nyquist.bellcore.com (D.D. Chukurov)

28. NOVEMBER 1995. YUGOSLAV DAILY SURVEY

INTERVIEW GIVEN BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MILAN MILUTINOVIC TO "POLITIKA"

THE WAY PEACE CAME ABOUT

The people in Bosnia-Herzegovina had enough of war, both in the Republic of Srpska and the Muslim-Croatian Federation, says Milan Milutinovic. - The international community stresses that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina would not have ended yet had it not been for Belgrade and President Milosevic, Yugoslavia and its consistent quest for a peaceful solution from the very beginning of the crisis. - There can be no revision, i.e. amendments to the Dayton documents at the Paris Peace Conference. -Peace agreement with no winner or loser. - Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina in six months at latest.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FR of Yugoslavia, Milan Milutinovic, a member of the Yugoslav delegation at the Dayton negotiations, spoke to Hadzi Dragan Antic, Director of "Politika", about some less known details of the initialling of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. In reply to the question whether the things took the turn for the better after his assumption of the post of Foreign Minister, for it was at that time that the Geneva meeting took place at which the first paper was drawn up as a prelude to the solution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Minister Milutinovic said: "This is true in many way. Because of that, we strictly adhered to that paper which created room for the Dayton agreement. In point of fact, the Geneva "paper" was and remained the quintessence of the entire peace package. Even the New York "paper" was a supplemented and "extended" Geneva. Commenting the observation that as Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia he was immediately called in to bat for it and that rightaway something happened which raised hope that things would be solved more rapidly, especially after the Geneva meeting, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic said: "This is true. Like I already said, the Geneva meeting was of exceptional importance for it shaped the New York meeting as well and determined, for all practical purposes, most of the solutions from Dayton. In point of fact, the basis of the principles of the peace settlement signed on 21 November was laid in Geneva and New York. Of course, there were many attempts to revise fully the Geneva and New York agreements in Dayton, but we and other participants in this meeting, primarily the United States and the European Community, did not allow that the substance of these documents be changed. Before Dayton, we even maintained that nothing of substance should be added to the Geneva and New York documents for they were so comprehensive that they spelled out everything and they did so on only few pages. In Dayton, this grew to 150 pages of text. As some said, "holes were patched" with all the things that had not been agreed in Geneva and New York, which is only partially true. The truth is that the holes were patched in the sense of further circumscribing the institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and further describing their competence. Of course, the Constitution of Bosnia- Herzegovina was adopted and the principles for the elections were determined, but practically no essential issue which was not agreed in Geneva and New York came to the fore in Dayton. This particulary applies to the constitutional principles elaborated now in Dayton. In short, this was a very complex diplomatic action, real diplomatic operation preceded, of course, by the enormous engagement of our country and of President Milosevic and the consistent endeavour and principled option that only a peaceful solution can yield results and this was achieved in Dayton.

Q: Mr. Minister, there was the impression that the beginning of the negotiations was rather smooth and that they became dramatic during the last three days. Is this true?

A: Partially. Of course, the real drama took place in the last two days. Practically, in the last three days, although the preceding days, were not without excitement, for it was necessary to deal with a great quantity of material and options in all key documents, particularly with the military agreement, Constitution, elections - those were not easy issues at all. All this was built further in the Dayton "building", from the foundations laid down in Geneva and New York to the entire construction, but, of course, the "roof" was the point of trouble. The "roof" was the problem and it was the maps and the territorial separation lines between the Republic of Srpska and the Muslim-Croatian Federation. This caused the greatest problems and all three sides had to make certain concessions, some more and some less, but on average all of them made major concessions and this resulted in the agreement. Of course, the issue of maps made to some extent the whole event dramatic. Whenever we thought that we reached agreement on some issue, someone from the other two sides would oppose, which added a new act to this drama. Of course, not everything was tactics. Not everything was a game, as it could be assessed. Decisions had to be made, very important decisions indeed, which can have far-reaching consequences for the lives of the people in some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because of that, those decisions were neither easy nor simple and therefore particularly dramatic situations took place.

Q: In your opinion, what was the turning point in the negotiations?

A: The turning point which determined everything was the last day. Before the last day, we agreed on almost everything - the basic agreement and its 10 Annexes - and everything was prepared for the signing of the agreement, except the final declarations about maps. The Muslim side was most intransigent on that issue, as well as on all other issues, frequently without new and serious arguments. That is why we decided to sign what was agreed (the basic agreement and its Annexes) in order to clearly show who was to blame for eventual failure of the negotiations during which 80 per cent of all issues was completely agreed. When we informed our hosts about that, they were a bit hesitant, for this was, so to speak, a precedent in the diplomatic practice. But, they accepted that for the two sides were identical in many respects. The third, Muslim, side also accepted practically all written documents, except the unacceptable requests concerning the correction of the maps which caused the two-day drama. When this happened and when the hosts accepted our approach, the turning point took place and all happened in the next couple of hours. Of course, this could not have happened without the previous 20-day long talks and harmonization of an enormous number of documents which were practically agreed on; three or four issues remained for that day on which we agreed for half an hour, since everything had been previously so much talked over that everyone knew each other's position and the nuance in that position.

Q: Upon his arrival in Belgrade, President Milosevic said that the decisions had been made mostly unanimously by our, Yugoslav, delegation except in two cases. How did the Yugoslav delegation work? Can you tell us something more about the most disputed issues?

A: The most disputes were at the end about the maps and the military agreement. Of course, all parties including the Republic of Srpska had extremely different points of departure about the maps. We can say this also in other words - all sides expressed different points of departure. The different positions about the military agreement were more the matter of inadequate understanding among the members of the delegation of the Republic of Srpska of what it was really about. This is a very technical text, and if one is unfamiliar with the substance of the established mechanisms and the existing agreements on disarmament and arms race ban, one cannot understand it well either. One thing had to be clarified also among the all participants in the Dayton meeting that international forces which will arrive in Bosnia are not UNPROFOR forces any more but the forces entrusted with a more serious task and of more complex organization which, naturally, should not and will not come as an occupation force but to be deployed along the separation lines and to provide assistance during one-year period to the stabilization of the overall situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and practically to return the soldiers to their barracks, which means to ensure peace. Any one who refrains from the breach of peace has nothing to be afraid of, since very strict, thoroughly elaborated and precise rules of conduct for the international forces guarantee a completely unbiased approach towards all parties in the conflict.

Q: What are, according to your opinion, the crucial qualities of the achieved agreement?

A: The crucial quality is that the Agreement (when it is fully implemented) provides conditions for lasting and stable peace with clear definition of the future Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. that the two entities are masters in their own houses and that they will associate themselves at the level of Bosnia- Herzegovina and discuss all issues of their mutual interests. The main quality is peace and then that the both entities and all three peoples, i.e. all peoples in Bosnian and Herzegovina, will live together on completely new foundations. Of course, not only are the papers and the very text of the Agreement important. All this has to be put into practice. But, certain time and understanding will be required to get over the whole trauma which affected each part of Bosnia- Herzegovina and each family. This is neither simple nor easy task. The negotiations were burdened by the fact that a number of negotiators in Dayton viewed everything from the position of war and from trenches. From this position they looked at the maps and military agreement. Many of them simply did not understand that the peace came and that it was necessary, so to say, that someone told them that peace occurred. This was partially also the problem with the Muslim side as well as with the others. We suffered no such burden to look at things from trenches and this was a great advantage of our joint delegation, of its part from the FR of Yugoslavia in particular. However, those directly involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina looked at this from trenches and they needed not only these 20 days but perhaps much more time to understand that peace finally "came". The Dayton Agreement is an agreement on peace with all elements of a genuine peace agreement, with elements of delineations, maps, etc. Except that compared to the other peace agreements known to us from history, this one has no victors or the vanquished. There is no one who won or capitulated. This is a difference, but a significant difference for us. In the civil war in the Bosnia-Herzegovina all this was much more difficult than when the peace is established between an occupied country and an occupier, where the occupier is defeated and driven out. Here they all continue to live together in the same territory, i.e. "the opposite side" does not leave its country, but it stays and must be your friend and neighbour.

Q: Can those "who looked out of trenches" find some deficiencies and what kind of deficiencies of the Agreement and to say that more or less could be achieved for one or the other side?

A: Certainly. They continued the fighting in their heads and assessed all solutions from the point what they would do in the case of a new war and whether this would be better starting position for them. This was a mistake in thinking and it must have caused certain misunderstandings and disagreements, and, as you can see, it caused them where it should not caused them the least - maps and military agreement. After certain period of time and after they read and analyze it a bit better, they will understand that it is not what many wanted to read in it.

Q: How do you describe one ordinary negotiating day in Dayton in the last three weeks?

A: In short, they were all the same. Everybody met everybody else "five times" during a day. It all began as early as 9 a.m. by scheduled and non-scheduled meetings. The group of experts worked hard on documents, draft documents, whether it was the paper concerning the elections, human rights, the civil implementation agreement, police forces. There were 11 annexes and each of them constituted a virtual international agreement with a number of legal and technical specificities, constitutional and legal provisions and a read line initiated in Geneva and New York has to be drawn through each document. We constantly returned to and assess each "letter" of the Geneva and New York document, which was as a kind of Bible for Dayton and the source for the elaboration of all documents. This was a rather complex job, i.e. the negotiation process and the work of experts, in which the experts from the Republic of Srpska participated on an equal footing, took place simultaneously. Naturally, parallel talks were held about the maps and the key political issues concerning the Constitution. The complexity of the negotiations was reflected in the fact that the negotiations were not conducted between the two but among the three parties, and America was present as the fourth party, and if the Contact Group and the European Union is added, there were four - five parties. It was a very complicated task to harmonize all the opinions about each question and literally the day passed in meetings - whether the head of the delegation met the other head of the delegation, whether the ministers for foreign affairs had separate or joint meetings, so that the working day never lasted less than 12-14 hours and for the experts and a number of us even 15-16 hours each day, and the last two days we practically worked until 6 a.m. and slept only 2-3 hours before the next continuation of the negotiations. Therefore, an ordinary day was never ordinary, it was never completely detailed, for there were always new questions to be solved in stride. However, perhaps some things could have been done faster. Of course, the problem of such international gatherings is also the method which cannot always and completely worked out in perfect, for different people are involved, with different levels of knowledge about different things, their political orientations and political platforms with which they came and with which they should return. All this had a limiting effect on everyone. Everyone was active within one's own limitations and tried to find its view of the entirety of things or of an individual problem.

Q: Do these political differences and platforms have certain risks for the maintenance of peace in Bosnia?

A: No, I do not think so. I think that the people in Bosnia- Herzegovina had enough of war, both in the Republic of Srpska and the Muslim-Croatian Federation. No one will dare, after such comprehensive peace agreement and such extensive involvement of the international community, do anything to mar this. Of course, individual accidents can be expected and there still can be hotheads which do not accept that peace has come and that now everything should be viewed from the aspect of peace. The main thing I want to say is that no germ of some special reason for cleavage had been built into the Dayton agreement. This is a great compromise for all three sides and I think that all three sides are aware of all these limitations and that there is no reason for fear.

Q: As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FR of Yugoslavia, how do you view the future of a new State called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the relations in the region in general?

A: From the perspective of all these meetings, from Geneva up to now, and there were many bilateral and multilateral meetings in which we participated, Yugoslavia has fully affirmed itself with its peaceful policy, while its principled policy, the struggle for truth and for the legal equality of all peoples in the region were fully valorized by the Dayton agreement, which conduce to the suspension of the sanctions. The international community received that with great relief, stressing that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina would not have ended yet had it not been for Belgrade and President Milosevic, Yugoslavia and its consistent quest for a peaceful solution from the beginning of the crisis. Of course, this is not the end. Much time and effort are needed for the implementation of the agreement and this is also a big task, in some aspects even bigger than this "red tape" which has been done. But, as far as Yugoslavia is concerned, I think that the suspension of the sanctions opened the door wide not only to the return of Yugoslavia to the international scene but also to its reincarnation in the region and a new kind of prestige which will be based on the completely different foundations than before. This primarily means its cooperation with Europe, but also with the most important factors in the world. Those who fought against Dayton and the peace agreement also fought against Yugoslavia's reappearance on the world scene. This was the most dreadful thing for them. They did not succeed in this, which only confirms that we were on the right track. However, there is an another thing that I would like to add and that is that Dayton will probably enters the annals as far as the history of the Yugoslav diplomacy is concerned. Not so much by the texts which were written and signed but by the fact that we fought out everything practically barehanded. The other two sides - both Croatian and Muslim -had their support, protectors and sponsors and we were in great measure alone with the enormous will to get the job done, to establish peace. Of course, the role of the host in all this, which was in many aspects crucial, cannot be forgotten.

Q: French Minister Herve de Charette has said that the Conference will take place in early December. Do you know something more about this?

A: At present, there are a number of dilemmas concerning the date. The Paris Conference has been announced for two terms from the beginning to the middle of December. The reasons for such uncertain fixing of date are beyond our power and we cannot influence this, for the obligations of many world statesmen who should attend the signing of the Agreement in Paris are involved. Of course, there is also the date of the London Conference which is equally important and which should be held on 8 and 9 December and which should also mean the economic implementation of the Dayton agreement which is very important for us because of the reconstruction of the entire region and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The order of events should be Paris and then London, although there are some ideas that it should be the other way round, but nothing has been finally agreed yet. The Paris Conference will certainly be in December and the international community is interested in holding both of them (Paris and London) as soon as possible and in using the Dayton momentum and its messages. However, it is exceptionally important to stress and explain here that no single document initialled in Dayton can be changed in Paris. The Dayton documents will be signed in Paris, which was also agreed in writing in Dayton. Some other questions can be discussed in Paris if proposed by the host, but certainly not the questions initialled in Dayton. In short, there are no possibilities for any revision, i.e. amendments of the Dayton documents.

Q: When will the first free elections be organized in Bosnia- Herzegovina?

A: In six months at the latest. We support the idea that the elections be held as soon as possible, for there are no reason to postpone them. Elections are of exceptional importance for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for both entities, in order to establish new authorities, on the basis of the Dayton agreement, which should create trust of the people that peace has come, do everything possible for the return of refugees and create normal conditions of life and, in final analysis, legalize Bosnia-Herzegovina within the framework of the new Constitution. For, if the new Constitution is carefully read there is no transitional solution until the elections. Therefore, the elections are necessary for the legality and, above all, for the substance. Accordingly, they should be held as soon as possible and not later than in six months. There were ideas that they be held within nine months, but we agreed on six months.

Q: When can we expect new maps?

A: We have, so to speak, rough maps. Large military maps are these days being completed in Dayton and Washington which practically include every hamlet, every inch of land; precise separation lines will be entered, for every millimetre to the left or right in the existing rough maps can mean 600 m to the left or right. In short, the maps are drawn and are very well known, i.e. all towns, villages, economic and other facilities and what is on which side, but the military maps will clearly show the separation lines.

Q: As a man interested in the contemporary technological development, can you tell us which role did computers have in Dayton?

A: A great role, for computers showed every inch of Bosnia- Herzegovina and we could even see the relief of Bosnia- Herzegovina filmed from the air and watch as if from a plane every river, every hamlet, every town as if we had travelled by plane over Bosnia-Herzegovina. When we talked about separation lines and corridors, we could see "live" how it would look like and we could "descend" from several thousand metres to only several hundred metres. Every single solution could be controlled on the map. Of course, it is on the experts of the Republic of Srpska to complete, with U.S. experts, this filigree map for which I think to have been completed.

Q: What was your relationship like, as Foreign Minister, with the head of the Yugoslav delegation?

A: This was full cooperation to the last detail.

Q: There were news that you were to go to the White House for signing?

A: Some journalists caused unnecessary confusion about this. Namely, it was agreed from the very beginning to initial the agreement, if adopted, in Dayton and sign it in Paris. The confusion was caused by the unverified idea that President Clinton intended to attend the initialling of the agreement in Dayton. However, since the finale and the dramatic turnabout in Dayton took place in only few hours, there were no conditions to realize the idea that President Clinton attend the initialling. Therefore, everything remained as agreed: the initialling in Dayton and the signing in Paris.