Greek media, which until the 1980s referred primarily to print media, has traditionally been a very active player in the nation’s political life, primarily by serving as a mouthpiece for the various political parties that needed a mass medium to reach a large audience. Although such official or unofficial party links obviously compromised the press’s expected adherence to the rules of fairness, they were mutually beneficial affiliations since they provided the media with guaranteed audiences. Thus, the media became for political parties, a disciple, a mechanism to reinforce political beliefs and inform about party activities, and even a means by which party followers could express their feelings in any public activity from riding the bus to assessing world affairs at the neighborhood kafeneio (coffee house). In short, buying a newspaper in Greece has traditionally been a public political act. With notable exceptions, this incestuous, relationship between press and political parties has dominated the fabric of Greek public life and guided the evolution of mass communication in Greece, much to the serious detriment of progressive civic behavior and genuine democratic discourse.

Thus nurtured, it did not take long for the press to become a theater for modern Greek life. Much like drama was ancient Greece’s colorful informant, creator of opinion, and means of escape, so today the media serves as the country’s loudspeaker for social causes, justice, ridicule and demagoguery. Unfortunately, as media evolved and multiplied, its partisan attachment did not change. Even in the era of broadcasting, a casual observer of Greek life today would quickly see that radio has followed precisely in the steps of its print brothers.

Television, on the other hand, is proving to be a considerably different story. First, its huge startup costs and equally huge profit potential have yielded some unorthodox ownership alliances between businessmen and publishers with dissimilar ideological bents. Second, the medium’s natural insatiable appetite for ratings has unexpectedly necessitated an interest in larger audiences regardless of political orientation--a focus that has forced a re-definition of the medium as mainly a product to be consumed. Thus, perhaps ironically, it is this new view that is yielding the first signs of modernization in the thinking of Greece’s media.

In a manner befitting the democratic capitalism with which Greece identifies itself today, it is profit, and not partisanship, that seems to be driving the thinking of media managers. Thus, just as specialized magazines are suddenly very popular in Greece, so is consumer appeal-driven television. The specter of “money-hungry” media owners and editors controlling crucial information may appear frightening. It must be recognized, however, that the trend matches traditional Western press values which view market-driven media as a prerequisite of a media system that treats the audience with respect, yearns for audience approval, and aims at the satisfaction of that audience rather than that of the power elite.

This new trend has been spurred by Greece’s new economic reality and technology-driven forces within media economics that have global relevance. The 1990s found Greece caught in the strong but uneven winds of economic change. As in the rest of Europe, newspapers lost 10-25 percent of their circulation and their income from advertising decreased by 20 percent. Greek advertisers spend less than one quarter of their advertising budgets on newspapers. While this is approximately the same amount allocated to magazines, periodicals quickly realized the importance of specialized audiences as advertising targets and worked to secure them for the advertisers. (Much like the U.S. and Europe, the most popular magazines in Greece are television guides.) By far the largest amount allocated to advertising--almost 60 percent--is spent on television. This percentage continues to grow.

Newspapers have reacted by analyzing reader preferences and trying to meet them--something largely unprecedented in Greece. They introduced new consumer-driven sections such as health, business, and leisure and made efforts to improve typesetting and color. Perhaps the most encouraging sign is that more serious newspapers have moved to the top of the Greek circulation charts (Ta Nea, Eleftherotypia, To Vima) replacing partisan newspapers at the fringe of the left and right (Avriani and Eleftheros Typos respectively). That was accomplished largely by toning down some of the partisan hysteria and by providing readers with more salient messages in better “packaging.”

Because Greece entered the eve of the 20th century following almost four centuries of occupation by the Ottomans, its public institutions did not evolve with the same speed as those of its sister European nations. The Greek press, which was started in Vienna in 1784 and moved to the mainland in 1821, started at a time when patronage, blind factionalism and violence dominated the country. Under the circumstances, it simply adjusted to the needs of the society it served. Despite the many political and technological changes that have intervened since and molded its present character, this inauspicious start influenced the life of the Greek press.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that even in the 1990s most Greek newspapers report the news only from a partisan perspective. The electronic media, however, has shaken the foundation of the Greek political and media establishments, and it is now dominating audience interest, setting the news agenda, and attracting advertising revenues. Despite the fact that many of the people who own, edit or report for this electronic media are the same as those that run the print media, a fundamental change is taking place--the attention is shifting away from the parties and their leaders, and toward the media consumers. Like the media, these consumers have also undergone profound economic, social, and ideological changes. Media strategists, therefore, can no longer afford to view them only as supporters of a particular party line.

The change in the media’s perception of the consumer began in the 1970s when all of a sudden Greek citizens/consumers could no longer be seen as having no news needs outside the party while their entertainment needs were left to the theater and the films.

The change was solidified in the 1980s and 1990s when the penetration of the Greek home by television necessitated a closer look at addressing a more complex set of consumer needs. It also helped to focus attention on the search for more generic audiences outside the political arena that the media was originally created to serve. The audience had suddenly become subdivided into consumers with a variety of communication needs that should be identified and served. Therefore, a capitalism-inspired “better mousetrap” had to be invented by the media and a political “detoxification” was a prerequisite to that process. That has been an encouraging development.

The increasing popularity of moderately partisan newspapers and the introduction of improved content and appearance, have signalled the progress that has been made in print media. Radio is just now going through the same partisanship cycle the print media followed a century ago, but commercial reality will probably bring it in line with consumption forces soon. It is television, however, that seems to be leading the effort toward the establishment of a consumer-driven media landscape for the future. The hope, of course, is that eventually a consumer-friendly media system will replace the current political party-driven system.

There are problems, however. Although creating or importing popular entertainment is not a problem, winning back the trust of the neglected, if not abused, information seekers will not be easy. Greek media consumers have replaced their justified incredulity with cynicism. It will not be easy for the Greek media to regain audience confidence. Electronic media may have a better chance at it because by its very nature it is more immediate and, therefore, gives the impression of being less mediated and more credible.

One of the first things that needs to be done by both media owners and media practitioners is the institutionalization, beyond its market value, of the belief that consumers are to be respected--they live in a complex, fast moving, interdependent world and have informational, educational, opinion, advertising and entertainment needs. These consumers lead busy lifes and expect that the media will satisfy their needs in an honest, fair, and efficient way.

If such a concept is truly and institutionally internalized, then it is bound to bring with it the corollary virtue of respecting truth, as it manifests itself in news facts or news sources. This, in turn, will have to lead to a reassessment of the fundamentals of media life--news worthiness determination, source verification methods, corroboration of facts, language and style consistency, news play fairness, entertainment values definition, and societal impact recognition. The re-evaluation of these procedures and goals will undoubtedly have a long overdue cathartic effect on the life of mass communicators in Greece.

Serious change will also require that reforms continue to moderate story selection and language choice. The relentless utilization of sensational story themes and gutter language has seriously undermined the institutions and the personalities that appear on the media’s daily news menus. It has therefore robbed Greek citizens of a key element of true democratic governance--the feeling of trust that the system is working and that they are a part of it. That has to deprive the citizen of his/her right to civic self respect and seems to have contributed to the Greeks’ recent increased feeling of cynicism, helplessness and distrust in the affairs and personnel of the “state.”

Is the Greek media ready to undertake these changes? No, but there are signs that the message is getting through. It is, perhaps, as unfortunate as it is true that it is the capitalist idea of profit that makes a mass medium to at least want to appear to be “objective.” Profit considerations pull it away from one-sidedness and toward a balance that is marketable to a wider audience of consumers. Nevertheless, such a goal has worked well for the media of most Western democracies and has transformed them into natural societal “shock absorbers.” This, in turn, has helped to keep those countries steady and on course, through political, economic, and social crises.

In order to develop the environment that is necessary for the creation of such a media system suited to the needs of the 21st century, Greece must also invest in the proper education of its mass communicators, especially its journalists. Since the 1950s, several “institutes,” mainly in Athens and Thessaloniki, have been offering certificates in journalism. The teachers have mainly been working journalists and the students primarily those who had been unable to enter a Greek university. The results were mediocre at best.

Some of these “institutes” or “schools of free studies,” are still in existence. The universities of Athens (Panteios) and Thessaloniki, however, are slowly starting study concentrations in mass communication and journalism. Since these programs carry the clout of “university education” they need to be well thought-out and supported by the academic as well as the professional journalistic (publishers/owners as well as reporters) and political communities of the country. Bringing all these constituencies together will not be easy. A new breed of educated journalists will undoubtedly present a serious challenge not only to the working journalists of today, but also to the publishers in their role as employers and to politicians as news sources.

But perhaps the biggest challenge for the Greek media lies outside its sphere of influence and is tied to the reformation of the political system itself. Will these politicians, who have been so spoiled by “friendly” newspapers, be able to “let go” of the stranglehold in which they have the media? Will politicians accept public review without the guarantee of an access to the public or of a response by their “own” medium? Will they be able to compete as news sources in a relatively patronage-free media marketplace? Will they be able, beyond “lip service,” to recognize and respect the value of a truly unattached press?

If one must look to history to prepare for the future, the signs are that Greece today has neither the political nor the media leadership to accomplish the tasks that lie ahead. This may not be as bad as it appears since, after all, the above scenario is perhaps too utopian for the Greek reality of today.

Nonetheless, tomorrow’s new faces and mentalities seem to be slowly emerging and all hope is not lost. In the end, Greece will have to settle for a media system that is no better and no worse than the people it serves. There are indications, however, that it will be better than its predecessor. Unfortunately, there is also evidence that not much will change. What a breath of fresh air it would be, if there were a coalescence of an enlightened, new leadership in the political world as well as in the media. Then, perhaps, this unnatural Oedipal relationship between politics and the press would be replaced by a healthier and more equitably applied adversarial relationship between those in power and their media watchdogs. In the meantime, one may have to settle for the cautiously optimistic mix of irony and hope encompassed in the words of Winston Churchill: “Greeks have survived in spite of all the world could do against them, and all they could do against themselves.”