Speakers of Swiss German [Schwyzerdutsch] made up 74 percent of Swiss citizens in the 1990s (only 65 percent of residents). Swiss German is spoken by a majority of inhabitants in 19 of the 26 cantons.(1) Why is the German-speaking majority in Switzerland not seen as aggressive by the country’s smaller language groups? Why, in contrast, have the Serbs--only two-fifths the population--been perceived as imperialist bullies by their immediate neighbors?

Switzerland holds thanks to many factors:

A History of Local Autonomy and Mutual Aid. From 1291 until the Napoleonic invasions Switzerland was a loose confederation [Bund] of German-speaking “cantons”--a defensive alliance against aggressive neighbors. The addition of a few French, Italian, and Romansch-speaking cantons in the 19th century did not dilute Swiss-German cultures. Segmentation facilitated solidarity.(2)

A Tradition of Armed Neutrality. Since 1815 Switzerland’s neutrality has been recognized by all Europe--a source of pride for most Swiss. A tradition of neutrality reduces prospects of meddling by powerful neighbors. The Swiss back their neutrality with a large and well-equipped army and a massive program of civilian shelters. The entire defense effort is a school of national integration--at least for men.(3)

Territoriality. A single language predominates in all but four cantons. There is an unwritten rule that linguistic boundaries, once settled, will not be altered. German, French, and Italian are official languages, while Romansch is a “national” language. Present language frontiers go back over 1,000 years.

Balance between Center and Cantons. The constitutions of 1847 and 1874 made Switzerland more a federation than a confederation. But the cantons retain more autonomy than do US States.

The Swiss use an affirmative action, quota system to make sure that each group has voice. Groups as well as individuals have rights. There is power-sharing rather than power-competition (the usual US approach). Both the government and other national organizations groups such as the Swiss Soccer Association are structured to prevent domination by any group. The government’s executive body, the Federal Council, consists of seven members--usually four German-speakers, two or three French, and sometimes an Italian, with its chair (the “federal president”) rotating each year. Like the US Senate, each Swiss canton has two seats in the upper chamber of the Swiss legislature.

No Ethnic Stratification. There is no rigid overlap of ethnicity with religion or wealth. Many French-speakers are Protestant while many German-speakers are Catholic. This contrasts with Quebec--largely French-speaking and Catholic. In Switzerland income differences are not based on language. Some French-speaking cantons, such as Geneva, are wealthy but others are poor; the same holds for German-speaking cantons.

The upshot is that Swiss share a common "civic culture." A culture of tolerance has replaced religious wars. Switzerland shows that persons of diverse languages and religions can cohabit in a spirit of mutual gain and openness.

Yugoslavia was one of the least repressive Communist states and one of the richest. A leader of the nonaligned movement, Yugoslavia was often courted both by Washington and Moscow. It had a federal structure and power-sharing arrangements similar to Switzerland’s. When the 1984 Winter Olympics convened in Sarajevo, it looked as though Yugoslavia was more "First" than "Second" or "Third World."(4) Despite all this, Yugoslavia went down in flames. Why?

The Serbian Plurality. Ever since Yugoslavia was formed in 1918, the smaller groups perceived the largest--the Serbs--as domineering. Unlike the Swiss Germans, however, the Serbs were not a decisive majority. In the 1980s Serbs and their close kin, the Montenegrins, made up two-fifths of the Yugoslav population. Many Serbs living outside of Serbia feared persecution by Muslims and Catholics.

Diverse Civilizations. All Swiss came from one civilization but three civilizations clashed in Yugoslavia: Serbs saw themselves as defenders of Orthodox Christianity against the Islam of Bosnian Muslims and Albanians and the Western Christianity of Croats and Slovenes. To be sure, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians spoke essentially the same language--”Serbo-Croat”--but wrote it using two different alphabets: the Cyrillic and Roman.

The clash began in the 3rd and 4th centuries when the Roman Empire and Christianity split into a Western branch, based in Rome, and an Eastern division, seated in Constantinople. Rome declined while Eastern Christianity flourished. But after Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, most Eastern Christians (except those in Russia) lived under Islamic rule--missing the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment that stamped Western Europe’s Catholics and Protestants. By the 19th and early 20th century, however, the Ottoman Empire was collapsing and Orthodox Greeks, Russians, Bulgarians, and Serbians contested Catholic Austria-Hungary for the spoils. But neither West nor East was monolithic. If push came to shove, national interests often outweighed ties of a common faith. In 1912-1913, for example, Orthodox Greeks £ought Orthodox Bulgarians for Macedonia.

History That Lives On. In World War I some Catholic Croats fought for Catholic Austria against Orthodox Serbs. In World War II Croatia became a Nazi puppet state. Croatia’s rulers carried out forced conversions to Catholicism and massacres of Orthodox Serbs living in the border regions of Krajina and Slavonia. One in six Serbs under Croat rule died in the war--more than 300,000.(5) Had so many Serbs not died then, Serbs might well have been a majority within Yugoslavia--even in Bosnia--in the 1990s. About one in fifteen Yugoslavs perished during World War II--many fighting German and Italian invaders; many fighting one another.

Marshal Tito’s Communist “Partisans” prevailed in civil war and forced out the Germans with some help from the USSR in 1945. Tito reimposed unity on the South Slavs and tried to mollify non-Serbs. He kept Krajina within Croatia despite the recent persecution of Serbs long settled there.(6) in The Yugoslav Constitution declared the languages of all the country’s nationalities to be equal. Only in the armed forces was the Serbo-Croat language mandatory.

Racial or physical differences did not divide Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. But each group felt exploited by the other. Serbs felt that they had been trimmed down just to make others feel better while others still feared Serbian imperialism. Slovens and Croats complained that they were taxed to benefit the poorer republics and got little in return. Non-Muslims feared Bosnian and Albanian Muslims. Ethnic Albanians and Hungarians chafed at Slavic dominance.

Do individuals count? No one but President Tito seemed able to hold the South Slavs together. In 1974 he rammed through a new constitution that weakened central power and made Yugoslavia more like a loose confederation. After Tito died in 1980, Serbs began to complain. Some academics called the 1974 constitution an “historic defeat” for Serbs, because it ripped Kosovo and Vojvodina from Serbia and made them autonomous republics.

Enter a new strong man--Slobodan Milosevic, who became leader of Serbia’s Communists in 1987. Whereas Tito had worked for Yugoslav “brotherhood,” Milosevic became an arch Serbian nationalist. He engineered the reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia and the overthrow of independent-minded leaders in Vojvodina. Popular for these feats, “Slobo” became President of Serbia in 1989.

Slovenia and Croatia were separatist, but Serbia was irredentist. If other republics split from Yugoslavia, Milosevic warned, Serbia would act to expand its borders and recover its irredenta.(7) Serbia cared little for Slovenia but Milosevic used the “Federal Yugoslav Army” to take from Croatia the borderlands heavily populated by Serbs. Having “cleansed” these areas of Croats, Milosevic accepted United Nations peace monitors to supervise a cease fire favoring Serbia’s gains.

Bosnia (full name=”Bosnia and Herzegovina”) became the next battleground. Muslims made up nearly half the population--1,905,000 in a total 4,355,000; next came Serbs (1,364,000) and Croats (752,000). With much higher fertility than the others, Muslims could expect one day to make up a clear majority. 8 This worried the Serbs, who feared Islamic fervor. Serbs believed that they could coexist with Muslims if all belonged to a larger Yugoslavia. But if Bosnia became independent, Bosnia’s Serbs would need strong guarantees for their own autonomy or else accession to a Greater Serbia.

The Orthodox-Muslim Clash. Why the bad blood between Serbs and Muslims? When Swiss looked back, they recalled victories that freed them from domination by the Hapsburg Empire; they also recalled Brother Klaus, who mediated differences between rural and urban cantons. But Serbs fixed on the year 1389 when the Ottoman Turks defeated the medieval Serbian kingdom at Kosovo Field. Many Serbs in the late 20th century saw all Muslims as evil--Turks, Bosnians, Albanians, and others.

In the 1990s few Bosnian Muslims practiced Islam with more than routine devotion. But Serb demagogues recalled how Bosnian Muslims cooperated with Croat Fascists in World War II. They warned that Muslims in Sarajevo wanted to establish an Islamic state linked with Turkey and Iran.(9)

Democratic forms sparked open warfare. As in Sri Lanka, the outvoted minority demanded a special status or the right to secede. Most of Bosnia’s Muslims, many Croats, and some Serbs favored a multicultural, multiethnic Bosnian state of citizens. But many Serbs demanded a Bosnian state of equal nations. If that were impossible, Serbs would partition the country and drive out Muslims from ethnically mixed areas.

For power-sharing to work in Bosnia, proportional representation was insufficient. Each group would need a veto over any far-reaching decisions. Responding to a suggestion by the European Community, Bosnia’s government in February 1992 organized a referendum--a popular election on whether to secede from Yugoslavia. Most Muslims and Croats voted for Bosnia’s independence, but Serbs stayed away, fearing they would be outvoted. Power-sharing collapsed. In April 1992 Europe and the United States recognized Bosnia’s independence, but war had already begun. Bosnian Serbs backed by the Federal Army seized whatever land they could within Bosnia, just as other Serbs had done in Croatia. Ethnic cleansing and genocide commenced.

Croats in Bosnia vacillated as the fighting spread. Some favored an independent Bosnia in which Croats joined with Muslims against Serbs. Other Bosnian Croats wanted to merge with Croatia. Meanwhile the government in Zagreb (capital of Croatia) zigged and zagged. Some in Zagreb wanted to divide Bosnia with Belgrade others endorsed a US-brokered confederation between Croatia and Bosnia; all wanted to recover Krajina from Serbia.

But the barbarism practiced by the South Slavs against each other in the 1990s mocked all religions (as it had also in 1912-1913 and the 1940s). No group was innocent, but a CIA study concluded that Serbs were responsible for 90 percent of ethnic cleansing and genocide. In 1992 alone Serbs systematically raped more than 40,000 Bosnian Muslims and destroyed every major repository of Bosnian Muslim culture.(10)

In Sarajevo the ideal of multicultural cooperation was lived every day by the staffs of the newspaper Liberation, a radio station, and by physicians and nurses in besieged hospitals. The government in Sarajevo tried to keep Bosnia a secular state. The government’s seven-man executive body included President Izetbegovic and two other Muslims, two Croats, and two Serbs--an ethnic balance as in Switzerland. But when some Bosnian army units began using Muslim slogans, Croat and Serb leaders in Sarajevo protested. Izetbegovic replied in 1995 that the army was fighting to preserve freedom of all religions, but strains mounted.

Alternative Futures for Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnia could again become a single state as in 1992: it could be split between Croatia and Serbia; or it could be partitioned. UN mediators in the mid-1990s wanted to partition Bosnia into several cantons dominated by each ethnic group with a mixed capital in Sarajevo. Having taken nearly 70 percent of Bosnia, however, Bosnian Serbs were reluctant to accept a much smaller slice of the pie. Muslims, for their part, protested that it was wrong to break up a multinational state and that, if it had to be partitioned, Serbs should not be allowed to take what they gained by war. The United Nations pressured President Milosevic in Belgrade to stop supplies to the Bosnian Serbs, but it was not clear in 1995 that he could dictate to them--or really wanted to. And Russian “peace keepers” in the borderlands became notorious for winking--at a price--as Serbian Serbs supplied their irredentist kinsmen with petroleum and other embargoed goods.

The United States sponsored cooperation between Croatia and the Bosnian government against the Bosnian Serbs, but this was a fragile alliance.

Probably Bosnia could not be partitioned into ethnic units unless major ethnic cleansing took place. Any scheme to divide the country would leave substantial enclaves of Muslims in Serbian cantons and vice versa. A rival suggestion was to partition the country according to river valleys.(11) While this principle would permit some economic and environmental rationality, it would not allay the fears of Serbs unwilling to live with Muslims.

All parties grew weary. Each was tempted to accept whatever division existed on the ground. But if the international community accepted that “might makes right,” would there be any prospect of a “new world order”? As before World War I, the Balkans remained a powder keg.

Here are some implications drawn from comparisons of Switzerland and the South Slavs and other cases of ethnic calm and ethnic strife.

1. Promote a sense of mutual participation and mutual gain. Avoid any move that suggests a “tyranny of the majority.” Promote cooperation and respect for differences.

2. Give ethnic minorities a sense that they have an equal opportunity to take part in the cultural, economic, and political life of society. There is no magic voting formula. Neither majority-rule nor proportional representation will suffice where ethnic tensions are deep. Minorities may insist upon unanimity-- “consensus” --as the condition for any far-reaching policy.

3. Accommodate the diverse civilizations of your society.

4. Share the wealth to promote harmony.

5. Bury your hatchets. Do not be haunted by tribal myths of past defeats and glories. A long and troubled history need not be fatal. For Americans time has healed most wounds caused by Civil War and slavery. They elected five Southerners president in the 20th century and many seem ready to consider a black for the highest office.

6. Discuss openly what are the deep needs and interests of your society and its parts. To get a broad consensus is difficult but open debate filters out bad ideas and increases the likelihood that decisions will be durable. Individuals and groups disagree on what is good for them and for the country. There is no “national interest” etched in stone.

7. Respect and try to understand minorities within your own society. History gives lesser or weaker peoples cause to fear exploitation.

1.Uphold your interests but avoid needless provocation of other ethnic groups. To avoid the fate of Yugoslavia each ethnic group--small and large--must demonstrate its commitment to fair play and mutual gain.

2. Protect and enhance your own culture but do not spurn the dominant one. You can understand its values and language without negating your own. Do not assert your unique qualities or superiority.

3. Do not forget your past but live in the present and look to the future. Isolation and local self-sufficiency are becoming less feasible.

4. If you face repression, try to mobilize the international community to intervene in your behalf. Recognize, however, that the United Nations has limited will and ability to intervene. Most governments lean toward inaction. Their slogan: “Let somebody else do it.” Ultimately most peoples at risk must rely upon their own resources.

Ten options stand before potential intervenors--individual states and the United Nations. The first two amount to standing pat.

1. Hands off. Outsiders have no right or duty or ability to meddle. Only the contenders can straighten out their affairs.

2. Firmly uphold the political and territorial status quo. Do not allow minorities to alter boundaries or create new states. The horrors of civil war outweigh whatever good might come from creating new nation-states.

The next three options are high risk:

3. Employ deftly the tools of recognition, nonrecognition, and derecognition. The West and United Nations prudently waited until Soviet central power had collapsed to recognize states breaking from the USSR. But Western Europe may have added to Balkan frictions by early recognition of secessionist states.

4. Utilize conditional economic aid and sanctions. The United Nations has tried to use economic leverage to uphold self-determination and peace in the Balkans and elsewhere. But the process takes much time to generate the sought-for effect. It often hurts the common people while sparing or even enriching privileged elites.

5. Intervene with force to keep peace or make peace. In the Balkans UN peace keepers have tried to uphold cease fires; to maintain safe havens to ensure humanitarian food deliveries; and to serve as a fire break against wider war. But UN and other foreign peace keepers often experience “mission creep” as peacekeeping becomes peacemaking--enforcement. Thus, UN forces in the Balkans felt compelled to call in NATO aircraft to attack Bosnian Serbs when they violated ceasefires and arms exclusion zones.

Here are five options--each a low risk instrument for “preventive diplomacy”:

6. Mediate. Let third-parties promote negotiations between contending groups. Let tempers cool and dialogue develop. If negotiations stall, offer suggestions.

7. Transform. Help with “peace building”-change the economic and social conditions that give rise to ethnic strife.

8. Legislate. Revise and alter international law to give more protection and voice to minorities. Give them more effective representation within international organizations.

9. Monitor. Observe and report on cease fires, on human rights observance, on elections, and on referenda.

10. Develop “early-warning” indicators that can point to a need for crisis prevention or preparations to receive refugees. Interview persons crossing borders. Study satellite photos to learn whether fields are planted and harvested on schedule.

No options are risk free. But merely to stand by can also be dangerous.

1. Swiss Germans use High German (Hochdeutsch) in the mass media, the schools, and in government, but socially they speak a local dialect of Swiss German [Schwyzerdutsch]. Most writing is in High German. Differences among the more than twenty Swiss-German dialects became more pronounced in the 1980s. Swiss Germans continue to esteem the culture of their own valley, town, and canton.
2. Under the influence of the retired General, Todor Atanasovski, a former head of Yugoslavia’s Territorial Defense, FYROM is developing a system of partisan warfare to defend itself in the event of war.
3. Rural French-speakers, however, resisted the centralizing constitution established in 1847.
4. Similar to the Minuteman militias of Lexington and Concord, every Swiss male has one hand on the plow (or computer) and another on his rifle. Switzerland can mobilize nearly half a million men in one or two days from a well-trained territorial militia. Some women volunteer as auxiliaries.
5. Appearances can deceive. Los Angeles looked integrated as it hosted the Summer Olympics in 1984. A few years later it was wracked by race riots.
6. Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country: Yuqoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 125-27. Professor Vladimir Zerjavic at the University of Zagreb concludes that in Croatia some 40 percent of Muslims and 17 percent of Serbs were killed during the war but only 3.6 percent of Croats.
7. In this borderland Austria settled Serbs to protect against Turkish attack. Krajina was home to the Serbian nationalist who assassinated Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 in Sarajevo. A Serbian folk song captures the spirit of the of Krajina: Krajina’s like a blood-soaked rag; Blood is our fare at noon, blood still at evening... With never a peaceful day.... The barren landscape cannot easily support a large population.
8. Reflecting the “clash of civilizations,” the Vatican recognized Slovenia and Croatia even before the European Community in January 1992.
9. Most Bosnians had been Bogomil Christians for more than 1,000 years-an egalitarian sect persecuted both by Orthodox and Western Christian armies. But in the 15th century many Bosnians converted to Islam-faith of their Ottoman Turk conquerors. Some Bosnian Muslims became landlords and tax collectors for the Ottomans. Class as well as religion divided them from their Christian neighbors.
10. To be sure, Alija Izetbegovic, elected president of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, called for pluralism. But in 1970 he had advocated an Islamic government-from Morocco to Indonesia. Muslims, he wrote, should "destroy the existing non-Islamic power" and "build up a new Islamic one."
11. Some Croat residents of Switzerland traveled to Bosnia for "rape weekends."
12. Stjepko Golubic, Susan Campbell, & Thomas Golubic, "How Not to Divide the Indivisible," in Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan War (Stony Creek CT: Pamphleteer’s Press, 1993), pp. 209-32.