GREEKS LOVE CONFERENCES. They have organized dozens since 1989. In most cases, their focus has been developments in the Balkans. It seems that Greece is forced to re-discover her neighborhood that she quite neglected during the Cold War (with the exception of Turkey). In these conferences politicians from left to right indefatigably first deplore the present instability in Southeastern Europe and then proceed with presenting the enhanced economic opportunities the whole region to the North holds for Greek capital. Words such as economic penetration of the hinterland are used with ease to describe what Greeks should do in the Balkans. There is no need to emphasize that such imperialist talk is no music to the ears of Greece's neighbors. What this vocabulary shows is arrogance coupled with a profound lack of knowledge and good judgement on the part of Greeks for what is going on beyond their northern borders. But the problem is not so much with words, as illustrative as they might be, but with deeds.

Greece's Balkan policy after 1989 is a showcase of what a states foreign policy should not be. The policy has been ill-informed, lacking both priorities and flexibility. Greece's Balkan policy has been subordinated to domestic politics and the erratic and volatile public opinion. There has been neither a comprehensive strategy nor good tactics. In sum, Greek foreign policy in the Balkans has been ill-conceived and miserably executed. It is no wonder then that the policy has backfired.

To put it straight: on all accounts the Macedonian adventure of the Greek foreign policy has been a failure. Not only has the new republic been recognized by most states of the world but Greece has received considerable negative publicity that has branded her a spoiler and a destabilizer in the region. It is time to make some sober assessments and, to pass some harsh judgements on those who formulated a maximalist foreign policy agenda that contained the seeds of its own failure from the moment it was conceived, for the sake of their own short-term political fortunes.

In 1989 Greece confronted a tremendous historical opportunity. No longer was the nation a puppet of Great Powers as it had been for most of its history as an independent state. Greece had managed to turn the national trauma of Cyprus into a unique historical success, with the establishment and consolidation of a well-functioning democracy, while also being constructively engaged abroad. For all the mistakes that were made, Greek foreign policy had managed to emancipate itself from foreign intervention and to establish a healthy relationship with the country's friends and allies in the West. Most importantly, Greece had won a seat at the top table with her membership in the European Community and NATO. Furthermore, she had executed a successful Nordpolitik of close relations with the communist nations of the Balkans. In other words, in 1989 Greece possessed the diplomatic and economic capital to play a significant part in the transition of Balkan states towards free market parliamentary democracies. Instead, she decided to waste all the valuable capital she had accumulated in the previous years, in an absurd and increasingly vain attempt to prevent a neighboring state from using the name Macedonia.

This paper draws upon this experience to argue that Greece has the potential to play an important role in the Balkans but, in most cases, has failed to do so. This failure should be attributed to:

a. the weakness of Greek political institutions coupled with a tendency towards populist politics,

b. the reemergence of the identity question that has not yet found an answer,

c. the astonishing lack of confidence on the strengths of the Greek state and society suffered by most Greeks. This insecurity is the product of the historical vulnerability of Greece and Turkeys present-day threats. Today, however, this insecurity makes Greeks overreact on issues of minor importance and thus, lose the perspective needed to prioritize concerns and to manoeuvre effectively.

d. Insecurity feeds parochialism. It is only natural for a small country to articulate its foreign policy in regional rather than in global terms. But Greece has been indifferent and quite ignorant of the broader issues that preoccupy Europe and the world today. Thus, Greeks often find themselves unable to communicate their concerns because these concerns are framed in parochial, Greek-centered terms.

e. The severity of the economic crisis that has damaged Greece's position within the European Union while at the same time has constrained Greece's potential for positive political initiatives in the Balkans.

It is really frustrating to hear excited politicians talk about open borders and the new Balkans, while they do nothing to help Greece grasp the opportunities opened up with the demise of communism but allow her to become part of the Balkan problem instead of part of its solution. The aforementioned posture has had considerable economic consequences for the country:

a. With the explosion of the Macedonia issue, efforts to deal with the chronic fiscal crisis of the nation and the reconstruction of its economy have been complicated. The governments energies and attention were diverted. The previous New Democracy administration found it difficult to implement a vigorous stabilization program because it chose to spend some of the precious little political capital it had on a possible compromise on Macedonia. By the fall of 1993 the liberal-reformers within New Democracy who advocated orthodox economic policies at home and a compromise abroad, found themselves politically isolated. The government fell and a coalition of nationalist-protectionists carried the day.

b. Foreign investors were scared away from a country that aspires to become a regional hub and at the same time cannot get along with most of its neighbors.

c. Local business was hurt particularly in northern Greece because of the embargo imposed on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Further, the embargo had the unanticipated effect of forcing a lot of economic activities to go underground at the moment when the Greek state was trying to crack down on the overextended black market of the country. In some cases the embargo criminalized the economies of the regions bordering the Greek-FYROM frontier allowing for smugglers and black marketeers to accumulate excessive profits and creating a whole network of illegal activities.

From the start of the Macedonian saga, Greece correctly articulated two main objectives for her policies towards the new republic. The first objective was to enhance the independence and stability of the new state. Greece wants neither a Greater Bulgaria nor a Greater Albania and, on that account, she prefers a buffer state in the center of the Balkans. As a status quo power, she has demonstrated her disdain for border changes and instability, opposing the dissolution of Yugoslavia to the very end. Instability within FYROM might increase the southward flux of economic immigrants and enhance Albanian revisionism.

The second objective was to bring FYROM within the Greek orbit and to make it as dependent on Greece as possible. Some used the word satellite, while others preferred to see FYROM as a subordinate player inside a Balkan Christian Orthodox camp. Disregarding such confrontational visions, there is no doubt that Athens, given her antagonism with Ankara, has a keen interest in preventing Turkey from re-entering the Balkans seventy-two years since the demise of the Ottoman empire.

Having set these two objectives Greece then followed the opposite course. Athens has insisted in the prohibition of the use of the name Macedonia by the new state and, to make her point clear, closed the border with FYROM in the hope of strangulating the new republic economically to force it into submission. All her actions during the last three years have aimed at undermining the stability of FYROM in one way or another. In doing so, she forced Skopje to seek regional allies in Sofia and Ankara. Turkey could not have missed the opportunity to assist the poor, vulnerable, little fellow against Greek aggressiveness. Setting strategic goals and then doing everything possible to make sure they are not fulfilled is a recipe for disaster.

Greeks have had great difficulty in explaining their policy abroad and in mustering some support for it, precisely because this policy has been contradictory. In fact the very term policy overestimates what has been a collection of actions with the sole purpose of appeasing the Greek public.

There are important lessons to be learned. They refer to both procedural and substantive matters. They include the following:

1. The macedonization of the Greek foreign policy has proved how weak the Greek foreign ministry apparatus and the Greek foreign policy-making bureaucracy are in contrast to the personal diplomacy exercised by ministers, prime ministers and their advisors. The most recent example of the aforementioned contrast is the imposition of the embargo announced by the prime minister with no prior consultation with the ministry that supposedly is responsible for the foreign policy of the country. Career ambassadors have repeatedly expressed their frustration over being constantly steam-rollered by the ambitions and quest for short-term political gains of ministers and prime ministers.

Moreover, in today's complicated world, policies must be well-informed and long-term based. This can only be achieved through a highly trained, top quality foreign service with well-established links with foreign diplomats. Instead, Greek diplomats have neither the confidence nor the status to play a serious role in the formulation of policies. They are usually ignored and invited to help only in last minute damage-control.

2. Foreign policy is not made in the streets. In present-day media democracies, public opinion plays a dominant role in policy-making. No policy that aspires to be successful in the long-run can ignore this fact. However, public opinion is volatile and sentimental and sometimes ill-informed. A political leadership worthy of the name first and foremost should establish the national interest of the country, and then take all the measures necessary to advance it.

What happened in Greece was that politicians deliberately misinformed the public. What they admitted in private they were afraid to state in public. The result was to follow a policy they knew was wrong and destined to fail. Former Prime Minister Mitsotakis has been quite frank about this contradiction.

3. Related to the former point is what might be called the broadening of the foreign-policy community to include mayors, priests, business leaders, and associations of any kind. Though a testimony to the awakening of a vibrant civil society, this development is highly inappropriate for foreign-policy making in particular. It seems as if local leaders engage in what they cannot deal with to avoid dealing with what they can (and should). Unable to establish a decent garbage-collection system in their localities, they insist on having a say in the foreign policy of the country, secure in their positions and not having to bear any of the consequences if the policy fails.

There are extremists with powerful connections in the army, the media and the Church. Yet their extremism secures them a marginal place in the current political debate. Even more dangerous are some moderates of the mainstream parties, who nurture the insecurities of the Greek public against a constructive engagement of the country abroad.

4. No policy can be successful without prior knowledge of the situation involved. It is astonishing how little Greeks know about the Balkans despite their aspirations to play an important role in the region. The Greeks lack of knowledge is in sharp contrast with what their northern neighbors know about Greece. Perhaps because of the openness of Greek society and the well-developed spy network inherited from the communist era, the fact is that Greece's northern neighbors have a much better idea of what Greek politics and society is all about than what most Greeks know about their neighbors.

Demonizing Kiro Gligorov is not very helpful. Acknowledging the mans extraordinary political skills is a first step in trying to understand the dynamics currently at play in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Establishing educational projects, training new experts in Balkan affairs and shifting some of the little research conducted on Western Europe towards the Balkans could help to decrease Greece's present Balkan illiteracy. High-profile, expensive conferences where stereotypes are recited is not the way to go.

A striking example of how little the Greeks know about the Balkans concerns the Milosevits-Karadjits split in the summer of 1994 over the war in Bosnia. Athens remained completely bewildered by the on-going internal fighting between the two leaders of the Serbian nation, Greece's traditional friend and ally. No politician or journalist attempted to account for the internecine quarrel. The reason for Greece's bewilderment lay in the lack of knowledge of how deep the division is between, on the one hand, the urban, inner-Drina Serbia of the partisan tradition, and on the other hand, the mountainous, outer-Drina Bosnia of the chetnik, royalist tradition. Milosevits, the partisan, and Karadjits, the Mihailovits admirer, could not but collide sooner or later, especially since Pale had started threatening Belgrades predominance in Serbian politics.

Needless to say that these connections were never made in the Greek mind, and the country's policy continued to be ill-informed. When asked to comment on the possible lifting of the trade sanctions against Serbia, the government welcomed the possibility. When subsequently asked to comment on the possibility of Milosevits pressing for the lifting of Greece's embargo on FYROM, the government spokesman could not make the connection. However, the fact is that the moment Milosevits gets the sanctions against Serbia lifted, he will press forcefully for the lifting of the Greek embargo in order to get what he always wanted: access to the port of Salonika.

5. Greece is a small country with very limited resources. Her foreign policy agenda has become too long in recent years. There is an urgent need for prioritization. The first item in the agenda can be none other than Turkey and the whole range of Greco-Turkish problems including the Aegean and Cyprus. To the East there is a threat: tangible and ever present. To the North there are risks: ethnic strife, economic decline, nation-state dysfunctions etc. But a threat is very different from a risk and there should be no confusion between the two.

6. There is no better way for safeguarding Greece's security, economic and physical, other than by deepening the country's integration into the European Union. This does not mean, however, that Greece wont remain for quite some time a special country, a country on the edge, at the crossroads of history and civilizations. Yet Greece can make a lot of good out of her particularity. Being Europe's bridge to the Balkans and the East could bear considerable advantages in terms of enhanced say in the formulation of Europe's policies. This presupposes a clear direction. No matter how much debate the Balkan turmoil has generated with regard to the national identity of the country, there can be no other goal but Europe.

7. For Greece to be successful in the aforementioned endeavor and to recuperate some of the lost time, she must articulate her foreign policy concerns in ways comprehensible and of interest to her West European partners. In other words, parochialism should be abandoned in favor of a vocabulary that strikes deep in what Europe considers important.

For instance, the rights of Greeks in Albania are not just a matter of bilateral Greek-Albanian relations but of pan-European importance, if articulated as a matter of human rights purported by Europe to be cherished. In other words, fitting Greek concerns within international principles and Western interests could considerably enhance the persuasiveness of Greek arguments abroad.

Regardless of the harsh comments of Western media, the fact of the matter is that Greece, given her wealth, democratic tradition and political orientation, will always be a pillar of stability and Western security in the region.

8. Greece should try to establish all the alliances necessary within and without the European Union, in order to maximize her bargaining power and to achieve her national goals. Greece can support Spain in the quest for more E.U. subsidies, France for a European defense, Germany for deepening Europe, Portugal and the Benelux countries for safeguarding the rights of small states in the Union, and Sweden and Finland for pressing for the respect of human rights in Turkey and the Balkans.

Even with Britain, some common ground can be found. In Bosnia, Britain has opposed United States’ lift and strike policy, and pushed for a political settlement of the dispute and the preservation of the arms embargo just like Greece. Most British involved in the current Balkan troubles, including Lord David Owen and Sir Michael Rose (former commander of the U.N. forces in Bosnia), have taken well balanced positions in the dispute blaming all sides without demonizing anyone.

In other words, Greek foreign policy has to preserve its room for maneuvering developing links with all players in the grand bazaar of Brussels. A stereotypical view of Greece as pro-Europe, constantly following France’s lead, should be avoided as bad politics. Greece should not be taken for granted, but should actively engage in the European debate by striking deals and alliances whenever necessary with whomever necessary. The general direction is more Europe, but Paris has its own agenda and so should Athens.

And yet, this does not complete the picture because next to state there are non-state actors. In today's highly institutionalized Europe, Greece can use for her own interest a multiple of non-state bodies including the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and numerous NGOs, that have proved quite harsh on Turkey and are very sensitive on human rights issues.

9. Finally, Greece should preserve the American connection to the best of her ability. The U.S. is the only non-Balkan nation so deeply involved in the politics of the Southern Balkans. The Sixth fleet is still the most formidable force in the Mediterranean. Greece is still dependent on American aid and technology to safeguard the balance of power in the Aegean. The U.S. is too big and too important to ignore. A good working relationship with Washington enhances a country's regional and European standing, as the Dutch, Norwegians and the Portugueses very well know.

Greeks should not make the mistake of assuming that the Americans have a detailed plan of supporting Turkey and Albania to the detriment of Greece, as tempting as this might be. There is no coherent U.S. policy for the Balkans, and there may never be. American policy-making is fragmented between the regional embassies, the State Department, the Pentagon, Congress and the White House. There are some general guidelines, but nothing more. Those familiar with the American political system know how difficult it is to formulate a policy in the absence of an overwhelming threat. The American system is characterized by built-in inertia, where competing centers and bureaucracies cancel out policy choices. The system is designed to maximize the power of minorities, as evidenced by Greeks success in electing two senators last November and placing the son of a Greek priest as the closest assistant to President Clinton.

Not all is gloom. There have been some successes. The two most noticeable ones of the last two years are the Greek presidency of the European Union and Greece's consent to the E.U.-Turkey customs union in exchange for a fixed timetable for Cyprus’s accession to the Union.

In the first case, Greece handled the presidency professionally and efficiently achieving the enlargement of the Union and a Russia-EU treaty. By resisting domestic pressures to use the EU presidency for her own narrow concerns, Greece proved that she can be a responsible European partner after all.

If Theodoros Pangalos is to be credited with the above successes, Giannis Kranidiotis should be praised for the E.U.-Turkey-Cyprus deal. With the effective use of the threat to veto any E.U.-Turkey rapprochement, Greece successfully linked European policies towards Turkey with Cyprus while de-linking Cyprus’s own accession from the prior settlement of the Cypriot question. Greek policy was flexible, innovative and ultimately successful. Greece was not cornered this time and came out with a deal that should much satisfy both Athens and Nicosia.

Cyprus’s accession to the European Union is justifiably a primary goal of Greek foreign policy. EU membership has the potential to unblock the current stalemate in the negotiations for a solution to the division of the island, thereby rendering many of the confederal elements of a solution ineffective and enhancing Greece's position within the Union.

The Republic of Cyprus should not be held hostage of Denktash and Ankara. Greece persuaded her E.U. partners that it is unfair to penalize the victim by granting Denktash a veto over Cyprus’s accession to the E.U. Instead, the Greek side managed to push the latter up in the European agenda and to secure a firm commitment for Cyprus’s entry, with or without the Turkish-Cypriots.

The possibility of Cyprus EU accession is extremely important and represents a fresh development that may lead to a breakthrough. These developments put enormous pressure on Denktash to accept a solution in order to share the benefits of membership and send a clear signal of who the legitimate government of the island is, further isolating the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Likewise, Brussels has become involved in the on-going political dialogue for a solution of the Cyprus problem, something the Turks strongly detest.

Cyprus’s membership in the EU will increase Nicosias weight in world affairs and will provide the islands economy with some very real benefits by boosting its wealth and growth potential. It will ease the security concerns of Nicosia over renewed Turkish aggression. Turkey would be very reluctant to use force against an E.U., and possibly WEU, member and cross a European border. Even much of the rationale for the British military bases in the island and the guarantee clauses of the 1960 treaty will have gone when Cyprus becomes member of Western European Union and the future European security structures.

Further, the full implementation of E.U. law will render ineffective many of the constitutional provisions on which Rauf Denktash has so much insisted. The Turkish-Cypriots have vehemently denied the Greek-Cypriots the right to settle and buy land in the Turkish-Cypriot cantons of the future bi-zonal federation from fear of being pushed to an inferior status by the superior Greek-Cypriot resources. But in a unified Cyprus, member of the E.U., such constitutional provisions will be irrelevant. On what grounds will a German or an Italian citizen be allowed to buy land in Kerynia and a Greek-Cypriot, citizen of the same state, will not?

Finally, Greece's position within the Union will be strengthened by having another Greek-speaking nation at the top table. Assuming a 17-member Union with full membership for Cyprus, there would be two Greek-speaking commissioners, thirty Greek-speaking Euro-MPs and a Greek-speaking member of the troika every three years. Even if the approaching intergovernmental conference restricts the role of small states in decision-making within the Union, Nicosias membership can only help Athens.

In addition, the accession of both Cyprus and Malta will move the Unions center of gravity southwards, after having tilted heavily towards the North with the entry of Sweden, Finland and Austria.

Given all the aforementioned benefits, it is still striking why it took Cyprus so long to apply for E.U. membership. There are many explanations, including AKELs dominance of Cypriot politics and its vigorous opposition to membership. In any case, Cyprus’s application and eventual membership could not be possible if it was not for a man and a people.

The man is Constantinos Karamanlis, who brought Greece into the Union in the first place and, thus made possible the kind of bargaining that took place in Brussels in the first months of 1995. As much as he is still blamed by many Cypriots for their islands misfortunes, he is ultimately responsible for bringing the second largest part of the Hellenic world inside the European family and thus for achieving enosis through the back door-as many Turkish hardliners readily observe.

The people is, of course, the Cypriots themselves. The Greek-Cypriots turned the 1974 disaster into an extraordinary economic miracle, making their island a Mediterranean Singapore, or given the proposed cantonization, the Switzerland of the Near East. Had it not been for the prosperity resulting from the post-1974 open door policy that firmly linked Cyprus to the world economy, it would have been impossible for Cyprus to apply with any considerable chance of success.

On the above point there is no way of overestimating the importance of fiscal health and a sound economy for a credible foreign policy. Greece should have learned this bitter lesson, based on the 1980s experience when she became a persistent underperformer in the Union, reversing a process of convergence with the advanced West European economies begun in the 1950s.

For all the talk about the vision of Europe, the E.U. is about economics rather than anything else. The new generation of European policy-makers have no memories of world wars and the Franco-German antagonism. Their experience has to do with unemployment and balance sheets. In contrast to their predecessors, the new generation is preoccupied more with costs and benefits than with elusive European ideals. In such an environment, Greeks will find it increasingly difficult to justify their place at the top table if they do not put their house in order. Arguments of Greece-the cradle of democracy fall on deaf ears of people who regard Greece simply as the single biggest net recipient of E.U. monetary transfers.

Of course, Cyprus’s entry has not yet occurred. Membership will take some time and considerable negotiating skills, but eventually it will happen. In the meantime, the E.U.-Turkey customs union will benefit Greece. It opens up considerable opportunities for Greek exports and capital. It enhances Turkeys European orientation and provides the sticks and carrots to stir Ankaras course towards more democracy, pluralism and tolerance. In the short term, it places another burden on Denktash. By signing the treaty, Turkey has relinquished much of its foreign trade policy to Brussels. She has accepted free trade with the E.U. members and a common external tariff for all other countries. Thus, Turkey can no longer follow her own trade policy towards the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Given the fact that Turkey is the sole trade partner of the TRNC for all practical purposes, imposing an external tariff or banning trade with TRNC altogether could have disastrous effects for the economy of the break-away republic and for Denktash's regime. That is why the Turks are so eager to talk of an economic union between the two, an idea, however, that is simply unacceptable to Greeks and Europeans alike.

This paper has by no means been an exhaustive account of the Greek foreign policy agenda of the last two years and beyond. On the contrary, the paper made a modest effort to account for some general characteristics of Greek foreign policy given the Macedonian experience, as well as to try to establish some guidelines for the immediate future. Most of the issues could not and were not addressed in the preceding few pages. The important thing is that foreign policy is like all other policies: pragmatism, flexibility, innovation, persuasion and hard work are rewarded with success.

It is easier to talk about these things today than it was two years ago and encouragingly enough more and more people have recently come out against the Macedonian hysteria that has swept the country. Of course, very few of us were there, when the country needed a strong, sober voice most, to support the Pineiro package or the Vans-Owen proposals.

During the last five years, a lot of mistakes have been made. Yet hardly any could be thought of as being fatal. Greece is firmly anchored in the European institutions. Safeguarding and deepening this anchor will be the great challenge for the political leadership of the country for the years to come, and will involve forging alliances in next years intergovernmental conference while undertaking bold economic reforms at home.

Two more tasks should take priority for Greek foreign policy in the near future. Greece should play a role in her region. She is uniquely qualified for such a task. Athens should strike a deal with Tirana and find an honorable way out of the present Macedonian mess.

Ultimately, the institutional problem of Greek foreign policy-making should be addressed as soon as possible. With emancipation comes responsibility. For most of the post-WW II period, Greece did not have to bother with foreign policy; Washington took care of it. Beginning in 1974 the Greek foreign policy-making mechanism has been overwhelmed by the demands of an independent and innovative policy to which both Karamanlis and Papandreou aspired. Karamanlis stepped into the vacuum and his personal diplomacy was successful in the 1970s. Personal diplomacy, however, is no longer a sufficient foundation for foreign policy, since issues have become too complicated to be dealt with by party lackeys and party apparatchiks. The Greek foreign service should gain the quality and esteem the diplomatic corps has in all countries with a foreign policy worthy of the name.

The political leadership sets the direction. Greeks are proud of the bipartisan consensus that emerged since the mid-1980s with regard to the European and Atlantic commitment of the country. But this is of little relevance today. No one is and no one could seriously question this commitment. The second world has gone, much of the third world is joining the first and the rest is rapidly descending to fourth or fifth world status. For Greece, there is nothing but Europe. So it is not the general course that is in question, but rather the tactics and the politics most appropriate to the diplomatic arena. Capable diplomats selected, promoted, and rewarded on merit are what the country needs most. After all, if the current modernization rhetoric is to have any meaning, it has to mean first and foremost meritocracy in place of clientellism and favoritism. Only with strong institutions, Greece will be able to navigate successfully through the storms of the post-Cold War era.