No state emerging from the ashes of Yugoslavia could be guaranteed because all were confronted with a minority problem which could become a security problem. In the case of Croatia, the Serbs remain an insurmountable difficulty; in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the loyalty of the Serbs and Croat minorities was demonstrably absent; Serbia cannot count on the support of its Muslim, Hungarian or Albanian populations and so on. Obviously, some minorities are more equal than others by dint of the particular size or military strength of the broader nation to which they belong. The difficulties faced by Bosnia and Macedonia, however, were especially acute.
These were reflected by the activities of the respective presidents, Alija Izetbegovic and Kiro Gligorov, in the period leading up to the outbreak of full-scale war between Serbs and Croats in June 1991.
Both men understood that in the event of a violent collapse of Yugoslavia, their two republics would come under the greatest pressure and, in all probability, be the two central theaters of war. Obviously Bosnia was the most vulnerable because it formed a wedge between the two main belligerents - Serbs and Croats, neither of whom disguised their territorial claims on the republic. But FYROM is still threatened for the same reasons.
Where do the similarities lie? The central problem facing both republics is one of internal stability. Neither can be assured of the loyalty of a substantial part of its population. In FYROM’s case, it is the Albanian population in the west and the capital, Skopje, who may undermine the state’s cohesion.
In both cases, the question of external aggression is secondary to the issue of internal stability although it places an enormous additional burden on the states as they attempt to assert their independence. In FYROM’s case, it is almost inconceivable that any of its four neighbors (notably the three with latent territorial claims, i.e. Albania, Serbia and Bulgaria) would infringe the country’s sovereignty until after a collapse of relations between the Albanians and Slav Macedonians (hereafter Macedonians).
The core population in both Bosnia and Macedonia are relative newcomers to the Balkan national game. In the past half a century, the Bosnian Moslems have discarded their guilt as the inheritors of Ottoman imperialist traditions an assumed many characteristics of a modern European nation. This was recognized by Tito, albeit for his own Machievellian purposes, by the granting of nationhood to the Moslems in 1971. The Macedonians, too, have only recently succeeded (again in part due to Tito’s policies) in asserting themselves as a self-contained national entity. Anybody who has enjoyed extensive contract with the Macedonians, will confirm that these people are neither Bulgarians, Serbs nor Greeks even if a century ago most all their ancestors would probably have described themselves as one of the three.
It is worth noting here that whereas the consciousness of Moslems in Bosnia and Serbia is thoroughly established and can only be destroyed by physical liquidation, if a war were to break out in FYROM, it would threaten not just the state but the Macedonian consciousness as such. Although a residual sense of being Macedonian might remain in small groups of the population, the majority would quite likely reassume Serb or Bulgarian identities.(1)
The aspiration towards statehood among Moslems and Macedonians was accelerated quite dramatically by the bread-up of Yugoslavia. Prior to 1991, there were not even any underground political organizations advocating an independent Bosnia or Macedonia (although Macedonian émigré organizations of Macedonians cherished what was at the time an unrealizable dream).
Both political elites initially recognized their relative weakness and inexperience by opposing independence until the last minute. Alija Izetbegovic traveled to Germany in December, 1991 in an attempt to dissuade Genscher and Kohl from recognizing Croatia. Once Croatia was recognized, the Bosnian Moslems were faced with a terrible choice-remain in a Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs and Milosevic in particular, or apply for international recognition as an independent state and brace themselves for the Serb and then Croat onslaughts both of which had been well-publicized, even if the Croats had been more discrete about their intentions. The Moslems chose the latter course which may have made sense had they received cast-iron guarantees from President Tudjman that the Croats would give their full backing to an independent Bosnia. Unfortunately, Tudjman was as bent on smashing Bosnia as Milosevic. Only the promise of American support (particularly in Croatia’s struggle to re-establish sovereignty over the Krajina) and the relegation of Moslems to a subordinate position in their relations with Croatia (which is what the Washington Agreement amount to) was enough to persuade Tudjman to cease Croatian aggression against Bosnia.
The elevation of the Moslems and Macedonians from their role during the Second World War as spear-carriers to co-stars in the present conflict has complicated the Balkan mess. Serbs and Croats alike wish to return the Moslems to the ranks of extras. Potentially, the Macedonians face even greater hostility. Of their four neighbors, only the Albanians have recognized both the Macedonian state and the Macedonian nation (although recognition of the former is conditional upon certain variable concessions being granted to the Albanian minority in FYROM).
The fear of independence in land-locked Bosnia (if we leave aside the small coastal town of Neum which is as Croat as you can get) and Macedonia points to the final similarity. Both territories occupy key strategic and economic positions on the Balkan peninsula. A Greater Serbia including most of Bosnia-Herzegovina hangs over the Adriatic coast like an impatient vulture. A Greater Croatia, including the Krajina and most of Bosnia, would overcome the communications difficulties which Croatia’s awkward topography presents and block Serbian territorial aspirations.
FYROM if both blessed and cursed as the only territory of the southern Balkans where the Balkan mountain range can be traversed both north to south and, with more difficulty, west to east. Should any of FYROM’s neighbors control the territory, they would determine whether the main transit route in the region runs from Belgrade to Thessaloniki or from Durres to Istanbul. Such are the geo-strategic realities that lie behind such apparently mindless disputes over Macedonia’s name and flag.
FYROM succeeded in escaping the Yugoslav federation without bloodshed. They also negotiated the voluntary withdrawal of the Yugoslav People’s Army by the end of April 1992 (this, of course, coincided with the beginning of major offensives in Bosnia-Herzegovina). FYROM’s impressive diplomatic victory should be tempered by the knowledge that the JNA took all its weaponry with it, leaving the new state almost completely unable to defend itself.(2)
Yet so far it has survived although it must be said against the odds. On the level of representation in government, President Gligorov has worked hard to integrate the PDP, the main Albanian party. Due to a combination of poverty, bureaucratic indolence and the fear of a Macedonian nationalist backlash, the state has been less successful in addressing the two central grievances put forward by the Albanian community-the development of Albanian-language schooling and representation in the police force (currently it is negligible).
The politics of the Albanians in western FYROM are complicated. Despite the evident efforts of Gligorov and the government to integrate them (by no means all Albanians are convinced of these efforts), the Albanians are reticent to trust the Macedonians. Especially during the 1980s, the Serbophile leadership of the Macedonian Communist Party dealt with the Albanian population even more harshly than its Serbian counterpart did in Kosovo. For Albanians, it will take more than two years of a verbal commitment on the part of Macedonians to reassure them that their jailers and persecutors of previous decades have really lost their influence.
In addition, the Albanians hold a peculiar place in the complex constellation of inter-Albanian relations, an area of study which has been regrettably ignored by journalists, academics and policy makers alike.
Albanians are split into two tribes which have developed distinct political preferences this century-the Gegs and the Tosks-and three political units, Albania western Macedonian and Skopje, and Kosovo, which have been stable geographically since the end of W.W. II. The line dividing Gegs and Tosks dissects Albania and Macedonia (and a little further south the confessional divide between the Moslem and Orthodox Albanian communities) but Kosovo is entirely Geg and almost exclusively Moslem (the Albanian Catholics are Gegs living largely in the Shkoder region).
Since the League of Prizren was formed in 1878, political competition between the three factions from central and south Albania, north Albania, and Kosovo on the other has been a key issue in intra-Albanian relations. Within this framework, the western Macedonian Albanians have never enjoyed an autonomous political status. Depending on historical circumstances, their political activity has been subordinate to either Tirana or Pristina.
The collapse of Yugoslavia and the relative weakness of the Macedonian state is changing this. Kosovars remain relatively impotent because of the repressive power of Serbia while President Berisha has relied upon a number of authoritarian mechanisms which have lightly damaged his democratic credentials but until now ensured him a free hand in intra-Albanian affairs.
Ironically, the FYROM Albanians in certain respects enjoy the greatest political freedom among all the Albanians and this has increased their relative weight in intra-Albanian struggles. The programs and divisions within the Albanian community of FYROM cannot be properly understood without reference to the Albanian question in the southern Balkans as a whole.
On one occasion (November 6, 1992), FYROM’s stability came close to being undermined when police shot dead three Albanian men and a Macedonian women at the Bit Pazar market in Skopje. One scholar has claimed that the Bit Pazar incident was exclusively an economic incident resulting from activities of the Albanian Mafia. “It is significant,” he continues, “that the clash produced no political echo either from the Albanians of western Macedonia or the leaderships of the PDP and the NDP (the National Democratic Party, the other much smaller Albanian grouping). (3)
I arrived in Skopje on the day after the incident to observe that most of the capital and Tetovo was in a state of war psychosis. The streets emptied and night and much of the population (Albanian and Macedonian) appeared to be bracing itself for a greater struggle. Both communities agree that it was only the authoritative intervention of Mirhat Emini, the then chairman of the PDP who enjoyed the confidence of the Macedonian leadership, that prevented a deterioration of the situation. Speaking in Albanian for almost half an hour (itself unprecedented), Emini appeared to all Albanians not to take to the streets.
The assumption that both communities are now committed to a peaceful co-existence misses the point. As the wars in Croatia and Bosnia demonstrated, external factors can alter the national consciousness of the masses in a matter of days (in July, 1991, in a mixed village in eastern Slavonia, I observed how the mildly Yugoslav identity of both Serbs and Croats was transformed into what in this case may be properly described as a Chetnik and Ustasa identity in the space of a week as the war closed in around them).
Just as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, only the tiniest minority actually desire conflict. The war in Bosnia did not begin because of a breakdown in social relations between the three national communities, but because the national principle dominated the elections of 1990. It was the collapse of political relations between the three communities which was the internal cause of the war. FYROM’s democracy functions in the same way. Although a greater party political differentiation is apparent within the Macedonian and Albanian communities than in the three Bosnian communities (although as the war developed, serious splits developed among all three), their MPs always vote along national lines on critical issues.
The danger facing FYROM is that the Albanian community will withdraw its commitment to state structures and establish alternative political institutions in Tetovo. Were this to happen, FYROM will have taken a large step on the road to war.
War in FYROM is not inevitable. Nonetheless, for the moment the country is trundling steadily towards political stagnation and breakdown which would preface war. It may not happen this year or next, but unless FYROM is knocked off its present trajectory, the threat is ever present. The political mechanism which alone may solve the constitutional chaos in the former Yugoslavia remains elusive. Worse still, very few people appear to be searching for it. Where, I ask myself, are the contemporary Trotskys, Bauers and Bibos? Certainly not hiding among the bureaucrats of the United Nations, the CSCE, the State Department of NATO, to name the main organizations who have been recently toying with the Macedonian Question.
While the war in Bosnia continues, FYROM is still low down on the priority list of western and Russian policy makers. Perhaps this explains why the international community is not capable of seeking lasting constitutional solutions but merely politically expedient responses which merely postpone the evil hour.
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