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THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA

Javier Solana, Foreign Minister of Spain

The whole post-Cold War European security architecture is at stake as NATO, the WEU and the European Union grapple with institutional developments and the prospect of enlargement. Next year, NATO, having completed its study on the implications of an eastward expansion, will face decisions of the utmost importance for the future not only of the Alliance but of European security as a whole. At the same time, the EU and the WEU will have a rendez-vous with the future as they prepare for the EU's Inter-Governmental Conference which could lead to a redesigned institutional framework for European defence. As current holders of both the EU and WEU Presidencies, Spain intends to do its utmost to contribute to a successful outcome of these endeavours.

Spain took over the six-month presidencies of both the European Union and the Western European Union at the beginning of July. This coincidence is as unprecedented as it is fortuitous. Indeed, it is also highly symbolic as the EU and WEU are studying ways of harmonizing their respective presidencies, in order to provide for closer links and better coordination between both European organizations.

These two simultaneous presidencies are a major challenge for Spain, not just because of the heavy workload they represent, but mainly because they are happening at an eventful time in European history. Both the EU and WEU have a rendez-vous with the future, as they prepare for the European Union's 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC).

The IGC has the appointed task of reviewing the 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The Maastricht provisions on security and defence (Article J.4 of the treaty and the annexed Declaration of the WEU countries) are explicitly included in this re-examination. Thereby, the institutional framework of European defence might be redesigned, taking a new step towards the development of the 'genuine European Security and Defence Identity' (ESDI) called for in Maastricht.

As the defence component of the Union, WEU will of course make its own contribution to the IGC's work on these matters, proposing ways to achieve 'a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defenceS, as envisaged in the Treaty (Article J.4.1).

But 1996 will be an eventful year for NATO as well, not just because of EU/WEU institutional developments, which will indeed strengthen the Alliance by consolidating its European pillar, but also because of the challenge of enlargement (with which the EU and WEU are also confronted). The study on the implications of an eastward expansion of the Atlantic Alliance has now been completed and Partners are being briefed on its conclusions. Next year, therefore, NATO will face decisions of the utmost significance for the future not only of the Organization but of European security as a whole.

Thus, there are three organizations facing similar changes with the same deadlines. Maybe this coincidence should be the starting point in our reflection on the European security agenda for the coming months. The task ahead is not just a debate among Western countries trying to reconcile divergent national interests inside the different organizations they belong to. It is the whole post-Cold War European security architecture which is at stake.

All of these issues are interrelated. The debate on European defence in WEU and the IGC must take into account operational considerations, the new crisis-management missions and the impact on NATO, without ever losing sight of the broader perspective of European construction. Both the EU and NATO have to adjust in some way to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. And all three organizations must work hard on the integration of the new Central and Eastern European democracies into a new European security architecture, where each country should find its own place while avoiding the establishment of new dividing lines on the Continent.

These new challenges (or rather new opportunities, the underlying problems being very old) demand from us careful reflection in the months ahead. Spain is aware of the complexity of this task. As holders of the Presidencies of the EU and WEU, as well as of the Group of Personal Representatives of the EU Foreign Ministers who are already working in preparation for the IGC, one of our main roles will be to create optimal conditions for such reflection. The discussion of this issue must be duly prepared and guided, in order to identify ways which could be practicable and acceptable for all.

Strengthening the Euro-Atlantic relationship

Nevertheless, difficult steps have yet to be taken in order to accomplish the Summit's ideas. Almost two years after its inception, the concrete modalities for the CJTFs concept are still under discussion both within NATO and WEU. Technically complex arrangements are required for the use of NATO's collective resources in WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. But we must not allow technicalities to get in the way of higher political objectives. We should be aware of the needs of a new and promising Atlantic partnership, and act with the necessary political will.

The bonds with our North American allies (and with other European NATO members as well) should be reinforced in parallel with developments in European defence cooperation. Indeed, greater European responsibility in defence matters will only be feasible within a strong Atlantic Alliance which firmly links together both sides of the Atlantic.

The European security and defence dimension

As usual, this question leads to many others: Should the Union take over all defence aspects, including the collective defence, or rather limit itself, at least initially, to peacekeeping and other crisis management missions? In case of merger, how could the problem of the diverging EU and WEU memberships be overcome? What about the differences of status regarding defence commitments and decisions, which exists at present in WEU, and maybe again in a future Union as a consequence of defence opt-outs? What are the requirements and consequences of enlargement for a European defence?

While we should avoid repeating the fruitless debates that preceded the drafting of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, I think we would be neglecting our duty if we failed to undertake a serious reflection on these issues. The review of Maastricht in 1996 (and the possibility to renounce the WEU Brussels Treaty after 1998) is much more than just a question of dates formally enshrined in treaty provisions. It has very much to do with the challenge of enlargement, which requires more appropriate institutional structures.

At the same time, it has to do with the need for more effective European action on the international scene (also in the NATO framework). Indeed, there is a growing lack of understanding on the part of public opinion concerning the absence of a truly European defence identity. International realities, like the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, lead to expectations that are not easy to reconcile with intra-European institutional boundaries, which in fact prevent a more coherent use of the different political, economic, humanitarian and military instruments of European crisis management.

The EU's CFSP

As a result, there is also an increased tendency to follow the path of least resistance in satisfying the need for greater European responsibility in defence matters - to ignore the problem and leave it to WEU, as the defence component of the Union. However, such an approach does not seem to be a lasting solution, as it is based on assumptions. In fact, the problem remains the same, as neutral EU members could also feel obliged to vote against entrusting WEU with the implementation of an EU decision which has defence implications (for this reason, some people suggest measures to prevent the blocking of consensus). Similarly, there is the questionable assumption that EU membership provides some sort of implicit security guarantee for countries which do not feel able or willing to accede to WEU and to the Atlantic Alliance.

We should ask ourselves if it is really such a good idea to keep going on this shaky ground instead of directly tackling the hard issues. The 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference will be an opportunity for the Union to make progress in the security and, in the long term, also in the defence field. The objective is not to build a traditional military alliance such as those that emerged during the Cold War; the threat of total war has been removed since then, and anyhow NATO continues to fulfil its core mission of collective defence. Rather, the objective is to complete European construction by providing it with the necessary defence dimension, without which the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy cannot develop consistently and achieve its full effectiveness.

Development of the WEU

Undoubtedly, WEU-EU relations are the more significant and complex part of this work; the need here is not just to study further practical measures to improve WEU-EU cooperation, but also to review the institutional links between both organizations. That is to say, the separation and task-sharing (security for the EU, defence for WEU) enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty.

In this respect, there is a broad range of possible options for the future institutional development of the European Security and Defence Identity, between the preservationof the 'status quo' (WEU-EU separation) and the full merger of WEU with the Union (which would then take over the European defence function). The discussion of these and other - intermediate - options has just begun and we expect a lively exchange of ideas on an issue of such importance for the future of European construction.

At the same time, work within WEU is speeding up in other very important areas. In the operational field, the Spanish Presidency is committed to the further development of WEU capabilities, in particular regarding the establishment of the new politico-military structures which were agreed upon at last May's Lisbon Ministerial meeting.

Likewise, during the coming months WEU will continue the 'common reflection' on the new European security conditions which started at the end of last year. This reflection is particularly enriched by the full participation of the nine Central and Eastern European states which are associate partners of WEU. This enables them to work with us in reaching a common understanding of the present risks affecting the security of Europe (which was the first part of this work) and in finding common answers to such risks.

The challenge of enlargement

One key element of our answer to that challenge will be the integration of new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into the Western security structures (NATO, WEU, EU). At the same time, we should not forget that another key element will be to proceed with this enlargement in a way that increases the security of all countries of the Continent, including those which at present are not able or willing to join our organizations.

In this sense, we should take into account the need for NATO, WEU and the EU to develop a relationship with Russia that is in accordance with its specific weight and wide range of interests. Likewise, as agreed at last December's CSCE/OSCE Budapest Summit, we should continue to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as the only truly pan-European and, at the same time, transatlantic institution, where all European countries can participate on an equal footing in work to improve the security of the Continent.

All these tasks will need a great deal of attention on the part of European and North American leaders during the coming months. We should not be discouraged by the complexities inherent in this work, which in fact aims at nothing less than a new design for the European Security Architecture. In its capacity as holder of the EU and WEU Presidencies, Spain intends to do its utmost to contribute to a successful outcome of this endeavour.