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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1994 APRIL: PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, 1993
Department of State Publication 10136
Office of the Secretary
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
LATIN AMERICAN OVERVIEW
CONTENTS
Latin America continued to have one of the highest levels of international
terrorist activity of any region in the world, but the rate has declined by
over 30 percent since 1992. Government counterterrorism successes in Peru
and Chile and continued disaffection with militant leftist ideologies
throughout the region account, in part, for the lower numbers. Even so, the
bombing of the US Embassy in Peru in July and of two American fast-food
franchises in Chile in September - as well as continued anti-Western
terrorism in other Latin American countries - are reminders that US
personnel and facilities in the region remain vulnerable.
As in previous years, most terrorist attacks in Latin America were
directed against domestic targets: government institutions and personnel,
economic infrastructure, and security forces. The violence claimed several
international victims, however, and the tendency for guerrilla groups to
turn increasingly to crime has led to an abundance of
kidnappings-for-profit throughout the region. Many of the targets of such
schemes have been wealthy businessmen or diplomats. In Colombia, a German
businessman was killed in a botched kidnap attempt in September, and the
body of an Italian honorary consul, kidnapped in the summer, was found in
November.
Violence continues to be most disruptive in Peru and Colombia, where
guerrillas and narcotraffickers are often linked. Counternarcotics
operations in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru risk coming
under fire as subversive groups seek to protect the revenue netted from
their narcotics operations. In addition, US and other foreign companies
involved in exploring and developing Latin America's natural resources have
often been targeted for attack. Foreign-owned oil pipelines in Colombia
again were targeted this year. Terrorist attacks against foreign religious
missions and aid workers also continue to be a problem; churches were
bombed in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, and three missionaries were kidnapped
in Panama.
In May, Nicaraguan authorities uncovered a large arms cache belonging to
a faction of El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
guerrillas in an auto repair shop in Managua. The cache contained
ammunition and several types of weapons--including surface-to-air
missiles--and documents, some of which pertained to an international
kidnapping ring operated by leftists in the 1980s. The investigation
revealed that the Managua repair shop was owned by a Spaniard--who is still
at large--with connections to Spain's ETA terrorist group. The Nicaraguan
Government invited Interpol and eight interested countries, including the
United States, to form an international commission to share information on
the case. Individuals connected to the current Nicaraguan Government are
not known to be involved in or aware of the arms caches or related
terrorist activities.
Terrorist organizations in Chile were seriously eroded over the past year
as a result of government counterterrorism successes and the continued
strength of its democratic institutions. Some old- line leftwing groups
remain active, but the number of attacks dropped dramatically this year,
and many of these represented criminal efforts by rogue elements to stay
afloat financially. Chilean terrorists planted bombs at several Mormon
churches, two McDonald's restaurants, and a Kentucky Fried Chicken
restaurant. The Dissident Faction of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front
(FPMR/D) and the Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL) may have been responsible for
these, as well as the vast majority of domestic terrorist attacks in the
past year. The 20th anniversary of the military coup that toppled President
Allende in 1973 sparked some terrorist violence in mid-September; 11
bombings in a two-day period injured 55 Chileans.
The Chilean Government arrested dozens of members of the remaining
terrorist organizations in 1993. Various elements of the Lautaro group were
captured, including Delfin Diaz Quezada, the organization's second in
command; the group's logistic chief; and the number-two commander of
Lautaro's elite squad, the Lautaro Rebel Forces. Chilean police were also
successful in their fight against the FPMR/D in 1993, capturing its
military chief, Mauricio Hernandez Norambuena. Norambuena is believed to be
behind several anti-US attacks in 1990 and 1991, which seriously injured an
American diplomat and included a LAW rocket assault against the Marine
Guard Detachment.
In November, a verdict was rendered in one of the country's most
contentious and longstanding terrorism cases. The intelligence officers
accused of ordering the assassination of former Chilean Foreign Minister
Orlando Letelier and his aide Ronni Moffitt in Washington in 1976 were
found guilty. Gen. Manuel Contreras and Col. Pedro Espinoza were sentenced
to seven and six years in prison, respectively, although both are appealing
the case to the Chilean Supreme Court.
Colombia continued to be one of the most violent countries in the region
in 1993, with numerous bombings against civilian targets attributed to
insurgent and drug-related terrorism. Insurgents continued to attack
foreign-owned oil pipelines on a regular basis, raising the number of
international terrorist incidents in Colombia significantly above those of
its neighbors.
Colombia's two major insurgent groups continued to demonstrate their
capacity for violence. In the fall, the Army of National Liberation (ELN)
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) waged a month long
offensive they dubbed Black September against government targets, including
ambushes on security forces in the countryside and stepped-up attacks on
government targets in Bogota. Shopping centers, buses, and tourist hotels
were targeted by guerrillas and narcotraffickers, sustaining the threat
that foreigners could be injured in a bomb blast. Colombian guerrillas
conducted cross-border attacks and kidnappings into neighboring countries.
The 17-month hunt for Medellin narcotics kingpin Pablo Escobar ended with
his death on 2 December in a shootout with a unit of the Government of
Colombia's Special Security Task Force.
The fate of three US missionaries kidnapped in March remains unknown.
They were taken from their New Tribes Mission (NTM) camp near the Colombian
border in Panama, but officials have speculated that the captors may have
been Colombian. The kidnappers originally demanded a $5 million ransom but
have since reduced the amount. A message recorded during the Christmas
holidays included all three men and satisfied NTM that they are alive.
A group calling itself Puka Inti, an indigenous term meaning Red Sun,
gained attention in Ecuador by bombing several government buildings over
the past year. Formed largely from dissident members of the defunct
Ecuadorian AVC guerrilla organization, Puka Inti probably has fewer than
100 members, and there is no evidence of public support for the group. Puka
Inti was responsible for scattered minor bombings in 1993. Ecuador had been
nearly free from terrorist acts during the past two years.
Peru's two insurgent groups, the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the
smaller, Marxist, Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) suffered
setbacks in the face of ongoing government counterterrorism operations.
SL--badly stung by continued government successes against it-- retains a
much larger number of committed combatants than MRTA and is more difficult
to dismantle. The group was caught offguard in the fall when the Peruvian
Government publicized three letters written by imprisoned SL leader Abimael
Guzman requesting peace talks. Guzman read the letters aloud in videotapes
shown on national television. Guzman's hyperbolic praise for the Fujimori
government in the second letter raised doubts about his intentions, and the
videos did not halt the violence.
SL was disrupted but not dismantled by the setbacks in 1993 and
continues to wage easy-to-plan attacks on vulnerable targets, including
businesses and the tourist industry. Indeed, terrorist attacks in Lima
proliferated during the year, as SL's damaged military capabilities led it
to focus on less-well-protected civilian targets. In May, SL bombed the
Chilean Embassy to protest talks between Santiago and Lima designed to
resolve a border dispute; no one was injured. Two Swiss tourists were
tortured and killed in early July. Also in July, the group set off a large
car bomb in front of the US Embassy on the eve of Peruvian Independence Day
celebrations. An Embassy guard was injured by shrapnel, and the building
suffered considerable damage. In November, presumed SL terrorists tossed a
satchel bomb in front of the US-Peruvian Binational Center, breaking
several windows but causing no injuries.
Attacks by SL in 1993 were plentiful but much less lethal than in
previous years and appeared to require fewer skilled operatives and less
coordination. The group continued to lash out violently to show that
neither Guzman's arrest nor his ``peace" letters have deterred them.
The government was more successful against MRTA, which was crippled by
arrests, defections, and in-fighting. In mid-November, MRTA bombed an
appliance store belonging to a Japanese-Peruvian entrepreneur the group had
kidnapped earlier in the year. Some dedicated members of MRTA remain at
large and are likely to continue trying to demonstrate the group's
viability. The organization's actions over the past year, however,
reinforced the view that it is nearly defunct.
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