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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT MARCH 1996:
FINANCIAL CRIMES AND MONEY LAUNDERING

United States Department of State

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs


MONEY LAUNDERING COMPARATIVE CHARTS

Each year the US has the task for assigning priorities to 201 nations and territories, using six differential categories ranging from High Priority to No Priority. The 1996 INCSR listing is attached.

INCSR rankings draw upon a number of factors which indicate (1) this is the money laundering situation in this nation/territory, ie, drugs, contraband, etc., (2) why we regard this situation as transcending local impact and having international ramifications; (3) impact on US interests; (4) whether the government taken appropriate legislative actions and, the breadth of those laws; (5) whether the laws are being effectively implemented; and (6) where US interests are involved, the degree of cooperation between the government and USG agencies. There are about two dozen subfactors which are considered. These factors are explained below.

A government can have comprehensive laws on its books and conduct aggressive enforcement efforts, but still be a high priority if the volume of money laundering continues to be substantial and continued vigilance by this government is essential to the effectiveness of the overall international effort.

When the severity of the money laundering problem places a government in the top three categories, and other deficiencies exist, the rankings indicate that these governments should take immediate action and will receive near-term priority attention from the USG. As one goes down through the rankings, remedial actions have less immediacy or less impact upon the US.

Ranking a government High Priority or Medium-High reflects a USG belief that near-term remedial action by that government is needed to deal with the problems cited in the individual summaries which follow the charts.

SELECTION CRITERIA

As any financial system can be penetrated, every country and territory has the potential of becoming a money laundering center. There is no precise measure of vulnerability for any financial system, but a check list of what drug money managers reportedly look for provides a basic guide.

  • Failure to criminalize money laundering from all serious crime or limiting the offense to narrow predicates, such as conviction of a drug trafficking offense, thus abetting efforts to commingle funds.
  • Rigid bank secrecy that cannot be penetrated for authorized law enforcement investigations.
  • Minimal or no identification requirements to conduct financial transactions, or widespread or protected use of anonymous, nominee, numbered or trustee accounts.
  • No required disclosure of the beneficial owner of an account or the true beneficiary of a transaction. Lack of effective monitoring of currency movements.
  • No recording requirements for large cash transactions.
  • No mandatory requirement for reporting suspicious transactions, or a pattern of inconsistent reporting under a voluntary system, or a lack of uniform guidelines from which to identify suspicious transactions.
  • Use of monetary instruments payable to bearers.
  • Well-established non-bank financial systems, especially where regulation and monitoring are lax.
  • Patterns of evasion of exchange controls by nominally legitimate businesses.
  • Ease of incorporation, especially where ownership can be held through nominees or bearer shares, or where off-the-shelf corporations can be acquired.
  • Limited or weak bank regulatory controls, especially in countries where the monetary or bank supervisory authority is understaffed, underskilled or uncommitted.
  • Well established offshore or tax-haven banking systems, especially countries where such banks and accounts can be readily established with minimal background investigations.
  • Extensive foreign banking operations, especially where there is significant wire transfer activity or multiple branches of the foreign banks, or limited audit authority over foreign-owned banks or institutions.
  • Limited asset seizure or confiscation capability.
  • Limited narcotics and money laundering enforcement and investigative capabilities.
  • Countries with free trade zones where there is little government presence or other oversight authority.
  • Patterns of official corruption or a laissez-faire attitude toward the business and banking communities.
  • Countries where the dollar is readily acceptable, especially countries where banks and other financial institutions allow dollar deposits.
  • Well-established access to international bullion trading centers in New York, Istanbul, Zurich, Dubai and Bombay.
  • Countries where there is a significant trade in or export of gems, particularly diamonds.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The strength, vitality and freedom of economies can serve as indicators of the relative vulnerability of a financial system to penetration by money launderers.

The 1996 data base introduces the element of relative black market activity, ranking virtually all sovereign governments on a scale of 1-5, with percentage of GDP as the defining factor.

Analysts assessing vulnerability can also use the existence of parallel economies as a measure, i.e, whether the parallel economy is seen as a major or minor factor in a given money laundering situation or is not significant.

There have been no empirical studies of this element, but, confirmed information on money laundering practices indicates that the parallel economy is a major factor in money laundering in a number of areas, including: Burma, Dominican Republic, Poland, Colombia, Hong Kong, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Russia, Thailand, Venezuela, Pakistan, India and the United States (the fungible economy which operates on both sides of the border with Mexico). Parallel economies are considered a minor factor in the money laundering situations in: Bolivia, Chile, China, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Macau, Taiwan, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Japan, Paraguay, Uruguay, Cote D'Ivoire, and St. Vincent & Grenadine. Parallel economies were not considered a significant money laundering factor in the other governments in the High, Medium-High, Medium and Low-Medium categories. There were not sufficient data to draw conclusions about the governments in the Low and No Priority categories.

CHANGES IN RANKINGS FOR 1996

1. Upgrades

RussiaMedium-High to High
TurkeyMedium-High to High
AntiguaMedium to Medium-High
AustriaMedium to Medium-High
CyprusMedium to Medium-High
IsraelMedium to Medium-High
CambodiaLow to Low-Medium
Czech RepublicLow to Medium
South AfricaLow to Low-Medium
SeychellesNo Priority to Low
SlovakiaNo Priority to Medium
Netherlands AntillesMedium-High to High
Dominican RepublicLow-Medium to Medium

2. Downgrades

AustraliaMedium to Low-Medium
NepalLow-Medium to Low
Sri LankaLow-Medium to Low

Expansion of the INCSR Data Base

From 1986 through 1995, the money laundering chapter data table listed comparative data on 10 elements for the 17 High Priority and 16 Medium- High Priority governments.

To give a fuller understanding of where governments stand in relation to each other on the broad range of elements which define legislative activity and identify other characteristics which can have relationship to money laundering activity, the 1996 INCSR data tables incorporate 25 elements for more than 190 governments.

Money Laundering Chart:

[Editor's Note: The above chart is an EXCEL file; see charts and graphs directory]

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1. Criminalized Drug Money Laundering The government has enacted laws criminalizing the offense of money laundering related to drug trafficking.

2. Record Large Transactions By law or regulation, banks are required to maintain records of large transactions in currency or other monetary instruments. An effective know-your-customer policy is considered a prerequisite in this category.

3. Maintain Records Over Time By law or regulation, banks are required to keep records, especially of large or unusual transactions, for a specified period of time, eg, five years. An effective know-your-customer policy is considered a prerequisite in this category.

4. Report Suspicious Transactions By law or regulation, banks are required (or permitted) to record and report suspicious or unusual transactions to designated authorities. An effective know-your-customer policy is considered a prerequisite in this category.

5. System of Identifying and Forfeiting Assets The government has enacted laws authorizing the tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of assets identified as relating to or being generated by money laundering activities.

6. Asset Sharing By law, regulation or bilateral agreement, the government permits sharing of seized assets with third party governments which assisted in the conduct of the underlying investigation.

7. Cooperates with Domestic Law Enforcement By law or regulation, banks are required to cooperate with authorized law enforcement investigations into money laundering or the predicate offense, including production of bank records, or otherwise lifting the veil of bank secrecy.

8. Cooperates with International Law Enforcement By law or regulation, banks are permitted/required to cooperate with authorized investigations involving or initiated by third party governments, including sharing of records or other financial data.

9. International Transportation of Currency By law or regulation, the government, in cooperation with banks, controls or monitors the flow of currency and monetary instruments crossing its borders. Of critical weight here are the presence or absence of wire transfer regulations and use of reports completed by each person transitting the country and reports of monetary instrument transmitters.

10. Mutual Legal Assistance By law or through treaty, the government is agreed to provide and receive mutual legal assistance, including the sharing of records and data.

11. Non-Drug Money Laundering The government has extended anti-money laundering statutes and regulations to include non-drug-related money laundering.

12. Non-Bank Financial Institutions By law or regulation, the government requires non-bank financial institutions to meet the same customer identification standards and adhere to the same reporting requirements that it imposes on banks.

13. Disclosure Protection By law, the government provides a "safe harbor" defense to banks or other financial institutions and their employees who provide otherwise confidential banking data to authorities in pursuit of authorized investigations.

14. Offshore Banking By law or regulation, the government authorizes the licensing of offshore banking facilities.

15. 1988 UN Convention The government has formally ratified the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances.

16. Compliance The government is meeting the goals of the 1988 UN Convention, in terms of the effective application of implementing legislation.

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