U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT MARCH 1996:
FINANCIAL CRIMES AND MONEY LAUNDERING
United States Department of State
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INCSR 1996 COUNTRY CHAPTERS
The Bahamas to Burma
The Bahamas. (Medium) The passage of the new money laundering
legislation reflects an increased emphasis by the GCOB on combating
money laundering. In addition to the new legislation, the current US-
Bahamas Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) authorizes, as an
exception to bank secrecy laws, access to records in cases of suspected
narcotics money laundering. The GCOB has agreed to an independent
evaluation of its money laundering controls by the Caribbean Financial
Action Task Force. The government had requested, however, that the
evaluation be postponed until 1996 so that it would occur after the
passage of the new money laundering law.
The GCOB has simplified procedures for registering shell corporations,
known as international business companies (IBCS), which can issue bearer
shares. Reporting requirements for IBCS, currently numbering over
38,000, are minimal and they could be used by criminals to facilitate
money laundering. Under Bahamian law, the assets of a convicted drug
offender are subject to forfeiture. A procedure also exists for the
civil forfeiture of assets which are the proceeds of trafficking or
which are used for trafficking. Over the last few years, the GCOB has
had difficulty making effective use of the asset forfeiture tools
available to it, in part because of the delays which plague the
country's legal system. During 1995, however, a joint effort by the
Ministry of Finance and Attorney General seemed to be producing positive
results in this area. Moreover, during 1995, drawn-out forfeiture
proceedings against valuable real estate formerly owned by Carlos
Lehder, a Colombian kingpin now jailed in the United States, were
completed, with the GCOB receiving uncontested title.
Bangladesh. (No Priority) The BDG has uncovered no evidence of money
laundering in Bangladesh. The Department of Narcotics Control (DNC)
proposed in 1994 to amend the 1990 Narcotics Control Act to encompass
money laundering, extradition, and controlled delivery, but DNC
officials say there has been no movement on this proposal in 1995.
Provisions for court-ordered examination of financial records or
confiscation of assets have been largely ineffective because of detailed
burden of proof requirements which discourage poorly trained law
enforcement officials from pursuing that avenue during investigations.
Belize. (Medium) Money laundering is considered a major potential
threat in Belize. Over 1000 companies are registered under the
International Business Companies Act (IBC). Belize Bank, a subsidiary
of Belize Holdings, is the only entity authorized to register companies
under the IBC. There are no laws in Belize making money laundering a
crime. There are no laws regulating the movement of currency in Belize.
Belize law also allows unrestricted use of bearer negotiable instruments
to conduct financial transactions. Inadequate regulations governing
off-shore investments are of concern. The GOB is considering new
legislation governing this sector and is preparing legislation that will
open up and govern off- shore banking as well. The GOB participated
actively in hemispheric meetings which gave rise to a recent anti-money
laundering communique.
Belgium. (Medium) Belgium is principally a transit country for illicit
drugs bound for larger markets in Western Europe, but the recent volume
of suspicious transaction reports suggests that Belgium is also a money
laundering center. Belgian law enforcement agencies see a continued
increase in drug trafficking from Asia and the Middle East via the
countries which formerly made up the Soviet Union. The report by the
financial analysis unit to the Ministries of Finance and Justice on
suspicious financial transactions showed 352 transactions in the first
ten months of 1995 which were referred to prosecutors for further
investigation.
The special unit (CTIF) set up in 1993 to look into suspicious
transactions reported by banks and other financial institutions actually
reports cases; from January 12, 1993 to June 30, 1995, the unit
transmitted 211 cases which involved 2,126 transaction reports. The
large volume of cases and reports and the value of these transactions --
over usd one billion in the first ten months of 1995 -- is a significant
volume for a country of 9 million inhabitants.
A Belgian law of 1990 provides criminal penalties for officials of
financial institutions who engage in money laundering under a "due
diligence" test whereby it need only be established that the officials
knew or should have known that the transactions involved proceeds from
criminal activity. Reporting a suspect transaction effectively
immunizes a financial institution from criminal prosecution, so coverage
is believed to be effective. A shortcoming of the Belgian law is that
the Ministry of Finance may only report to prosecutors cases where there
is evidence linking those involved in the transaction to specified
criminal activities (which include drug trafficking), rather than a
blanket provision covering all serious crimes. Officials involved in
investigating these cases say that the majority involved exchange houses
in Antwerp and Brussels being used by non-Belgian residents to convert
money from the currency of the country of origin (especially pounds
sterling) into the currency of the ultimate destination (most commonly
the Netherlands). Most of the rest of the total seems to be tax fraud
transactions, mainly involving the value added tax.
The 1990 money laundering law includes provisions to seize assets
derived from illegal activities when sufficient specific, concrete
evidence linking identifiable individuals is available to present to a
court of law. However, asset forfeiture and seizure has been minimal to
date.
Belgium is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and has
implemented the EU Directive on Money Laundering. Belgium has ratified
the 1988 UN Convention.
Benin. (No Priority) Benin is not considered an important financial
center in West Africa or in the world. There is no effective policy to
deal with money laundering in Benin. The laws on the books do not
adequately address the issue. There are no requirements to report
significant cash deposits in banks. Even if there were such
requirements, it is questionable how effective they would be given
Benin's large informal sector which is essentially a cash economy.
Significant cash deposits by market women are common and unremarkable.
There are no indicators available describing the extent to which money
laundering occurs in Benin, but determined money launderers in Benin
probably do not have difficult obstacles to overcome.
Bolivia. (Medium) With total bank deposits of little more than US$ 2
billion, the Bolivian financial system is not a significant participant
in international, or even regional, money laundering. Money laundering
is not a crime under Bolivian law, which provides instead strict bank
secrecy standards. To gain access to bank records, law enforcement
authorities must first obtain a court order and then file a request with
the Superintendent of Banks. International cooperation on record-
sharing is nil.
The Association of Banks has promulgated a code of conduct which calls
on banks to be alert to the possibility of money laundering and to avoid
dealings of a suspicious nature, but in the absence of sanctions and a
relaxing of bank secrecy provisions, the code is likely to accomplish
little. Resistance to change within the Bolivian financial sector
reflects a long tradition of corruption, tax evasion and contraband.
On the brighter side, Bolivia signed a new extradition treaty with the
United States in 1995 which will explicitly include drug money
laundering as an offense and require extradition of Bolivian nationals.
According to the prevailing interpretation of Bolivia's constitution, a
seized asset belonging to a narcotics trafficker may only be forfeited
after the trafficker is convicted. Because all cases must be appealed
to the Supreme Court, which is hopelessly backlogged, that can take
years. While the case is in progress, maintenance and upkeep of seized
assets is the responsibility of the government. On paper, the
government has custody of over $300 million in seized assets, but in
reality it holds much less -- the result of fraud, theft, and
deterioration of properties. As a partial remedy, the government issued
a decree in late December permitting the auctioning of seized assets
with the consent of the owner, with the proceeds available to the owner
if and when he is found innocent. This should prove attractive to the
government and traffickers alike in cases where assets depreciate
quickly or require constant care (e.g., new automobiles, cattle herds).
The government with technical assistance from the US Embassy is
developing mechanisms for using the revenues generated for
counternarcotics purposes.
Botswana. (No Priority)
Brazil. (Medium High) Gauging money laundering levels in Brazil is
somewhat difficult, due to Brazil's failure to criminalize money
laundering. A strong economy has increased the risk of money laundering
in Brazil, and estimates of illegal funds circulating range from tens of
millions to hundreds of billions of dollars. The Brazilian Justice
Minister has stated that Brazil will become a haven for illegal capital
if its controls continue to lag behind the rest of the world. There are
reports of foreign criminal interests buying up failing businesses such
as hotels, air taxi services, and transport, construction and insurance
companies to serve as repositories for laundering illicit profits.
On the international front, Brazil's lack of domestic legislation has
limited its ability to cooperate with other countries on money
laundering investigations. The GOB did contribute positively to the
Buenos Aires money laundering conference. The US/Brazil counterdrug
cooperation agreement signed in April of this year calls for the parties
to adopt and implement appropriate legislation on money laundering and
asset forefeiture. During 1995, two US agencies (the Customs Service
and FinCEN) presented seminars to Brazilian officials on measures to
control money laundering.
The Cardoso administration intends to submit legislation to congress
early in 1966 criminalizing money laundering and establishing a
financial crimes intelligence center. The law is expected to follow
OAS/CICAD recommendations in terms of easing bank secrecy, requiring
suspicious transaction reporting, establishing effective currency
reporting systems, and setting adequate sanctions for non-compliance.
British Virgin Islands. (Low) While sharing some degree of the
vulnerability of other offshore centers, especially due to its
chartering of international bearer share companies. Money laundering in
the BVI is currently considered minimal by US agencies.
Bulgaria. (Medium) Bulgaria is not considered an important financial
center, tax haven or off-shore banking center in the region. GOB
officials consider Bulgaria highly vulnerable to money laundering both
in the banking and non-banking financial systems although there is no
hard data on its extent. The money laundering which does occur may
relate to the sometimes illegal conversion of state assets to private
hands and other forms of illegal trade, as well as to narcotics
proceeds. There is no evidence that government policy or senior
officials encourage, facilitate or engage in money laundering
activities.
Bulgarian and US law enforcement agencies generally cooperate well in
counternarcotics investigatory efforts and information-sharing.
Information on in-progress Bulgarian criminal investigations subsequent
to arrest is held in secret, but is releasable to foreign law
enforcement agencies at the discretion of the prosecutor's office.
Although Bulgaria has signed and ratified the 1988 Convention and is
also a signatory to the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on laundering,
search, seizure and confiscation of proceeds from crime, it has not yet
passed implementing legislation on money laundering. The GOB has no
bilateral agreements with other countries on money-laundering.
Although the GOB has under a consideration a draft money laundering law
to reflect its obligations under the 1990 Council of Europe Convention,
money laundering is not now a criminal offense in Bulgaria, except in
some cases where it constitutes criminal concealment of another crime.
There have been no Bulgarian arrests or prosecutions for money-
laundering, and the current lack of comprehensive financial legislation
provides broad opportunities for traffickers to shield assets and
launder money.
Banks are not currently required to report the identity of customers
engaging in significant or suspicious, large currency transactions; the
draft law under consideration would require banks to report large
transactions only if they appeared suspicious and would not require
regular reporting. Although there is bank secrecy protection under the
law, banks are required to keep records to reconstruct significant
transactions through financial institutions to respond to information
requests from the government on criminal matters. This requirement also
appears in the draft law. Such money laundering controls would be
applied to money exchangers as well as banks.
There are controls on the ways money may be transferred into and out of
the country. There are not, however, due diligence or banker neglect
laws that make individual bankers responsible if their institutions
launder money. The draft law would criminalize intent but not neglect
in this regard.
Narcotics-related assets may be temporarily seized if directly related
to a narcotics-related crime, but they can not be forfeited except in
the context of a judicial sentence. The public prosecutor can request
seizure of a legitimate business if used to launder criminal proceeds
and hence conceal criminal activity. The GOB enforces asset seizure or
forfeiture if mandated in a judicial conviction or in a court decision
under the commercial code.
Burma. (Medium) The 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law
brought the Burmese legal code into technical conformity with the 1988
UN Convention. As such, the 1993 law contains useful legal tools for
addressing money laundering, the seizure of drug-related assets, and the
prosecution of drug conspiracy cases. However, to date these provisions
remain largely unused as Burmese police and judicial officials have been
slow to implement the law, targeting few if any major traffickers and
their drug related assets. The lack of vigorous enforcement against
money laundering leaves Burma vulnerable to the growing influence of
traffickers through the use of drug proceeds in legitimate business
ventures.
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