(Greece's Contribution to the 1996 Intergovernmental)
E. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Common Foreign Policy
56. During the last forty years, the contribution of the European Union to peace and stability in Europe has been significant. Nevertheless, as the Yugoslav and other recent crises have indicated, the EU lacks the instruments and clearly-defined objectives in order to deal effectively with the new situation which has arisen on our continent, as well as outside it, after the end of the Cold War. EU external action should aim at upholding the values constituting the essence of European integration. It should also contribute to the security of the continent and its periphery via the prevention and elimination of the sources of crisis.
A framework for the conduct of CFSP must include, as a minimum prerequisite, the recognition, respect, and guaranteeing of the provisions of International Law and Treaties. This framework will constitute the single legal system of the CFSP. Such CFSP actions should be undertaken on the basis of statutory principles agreed between the institutions and the member-States of the EU.
57. A genuine CFSP presupposes:
a) a clear definition of general principles and objectives having as a guide the gradual formulation of common basic interests, and
b) the development of practical measures of an institutional and procedural nature which will contribute to the deeper «communitarisation» of the current CFSP system and will render CFSP capable of protecting the territorial integrity and the external frontiers of the EU.
58. The provisions of the Treaty on European Union concerning CFSP led to high expectations, yet at same time caused deep disappointment, due to their shortcomings.
We believe that this is due to a lack of political will, which is essential for the formulation of common positions and the undertaking of common actions, and the actual pillar structure, with all the ensuing defects. We, therefore, support bringing the second pillar closer to the first, that is to say, its partial communitarisation. This would imply:
* more consistency and coherence in all aspects of the Union's external action
* wider participation of the institutions. The Commission should play a more active role in the fields of analysis, planning, implementation and management of common actions, while the European Parliament's power should be reinforced
* inclusion of all CFSP expenditure in the Union' s budget, allowing for the possibility of recourse, in exceptional cases, to national contributions.
59. Regarding the instruments and means that could make the CFSP more effective, we believe that the creation of an Analysis and Planning Unit, within the framework of the General Secretariat of the Council, along with the participation of the member states and the Commission, would greatly contribute to the formulation of common assessments and approaches concerning the problems which today are still subject to a variety of national approaches and interests. The functioning of this Unit will help promote the achievement of consensus. A more effective implementation of CFSP will require affording wider competences to the European Commission, while the role of the Council's Secretariat will need to be reinforced.
60. The objectives of CFSP should be clearly defined and broadened to include:
* the respect of human rights and democratic freedoms
* the guaranteeing of the EU's external frontiers and territorial integrity, as well as the adoption of a «solidarity and mutual defence assistance clause». Currently, the status of Member-State of the Union does not provide clear guarantees for its security. This fact constitutes a serious lacuna for an entity that presents itself to the outside world as a "Union".
* the contribution of the Union to the prevention of conflicts and the consolidation of stability, particularly in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean basin.
61. Community solidarity should be expressed in the revised Treaty with specific provisions. A clear commitment from the Union to protect its external frontiers, along with a mutual assistance clause, will contribute to the reinforcement of stability, particularly in the regions of potential political instability that border on the Union.
62. More specifically, in the case of Greece, the shaping of such a security environment will facilitate the transfer of substantial resources from the defence area, to the benefit of social and economic goals. In other words, there is a clear trade-off between the reinforcement of common security and the promotion of cohesion. It is worth reminding that, owing to the instability and insecurity in its surrounding region, Greece is obliged to spend a disproportionate share of its national resources on national and collective security purposes. As a percentage of its GNP, this share is the highest in the Union. Unlike the vast majority of Member States, therefore, Greece has been unable to reap the so-called «peace dividend».
63. Decision-making in this key-sector is exclusively based on the rule of unanimity. The extension of qualified majority voting to the second pillar in issues which do not affect the vital national interests of the country, should be considered in the light of the shape that this pillar will assume, as well as the degree of solidarity demonstrated, based on the adoption of the aforementioned goals.
64. Other means of Union external action could be examined, provided that the institutional integrity, the coherence of EU policy and the equal status of EU members is not endangered.
Common Security and Defence
65. Common Foreign and Security Policy should be complemented with a common defence policy and a common defence in order to become credible, effective and capable of facing the new threats and challenges that have emerged after the end of the Cold War. This policy will be complementary rather than antithetical to that of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO remains the main factor in the European security system.
66. In view of the need to develop an EU defence identity, the Western European Union (WEU) should be incorporated gradually in the EU, according to a specific timetable.
67. Greece supports the incorporation of the "Petersberg tasks" in the revised Treaty of the European Union.
68. Meanwhile, Greece supports the conclusion of a binding agreement between the EU and the WEU (i.e. for as long as the latter functions autonomously) on the basis of which the WEU will be obliged to carry out duties and missions assigned to it by the Union.
69. In any case, defence policy should be formulated within the institutions of the European Union. For this purpose, it will be necessary to provide for meetings of member states' Ministers of Defence in the framework of the Council.
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